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Striking the Right Balance: Hate Speech
Laws in Japan, the United States, and Canada
by CRAIG MARTIN*
Introduction
The issue of hate speech has occupied the headlines of many
democracies in recent years. Whether it be Charlottesville, Kyoto, or
Warsaw, the rise of nativist, nationalist, and racist groups, expressing hatred
towards minorities within society, has once again confronted us with the
question of how far democracies can or should go in limiting certain extreme
forms of hateful discriminatory expression. Certain types of hate speech,
which have the purpose and effect of fostering hatred against groups defined
by certain characteristics such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual
orientation, and which take the form of extreme vilification, denigration, and
even dehumanization of its targets, are known to cause significant harm.1
This harm is suffered by the members of such groups, both in the form of
direct emotional and psychological harm caused by the speech itself, and
also in the form of increased levels of discrimination and persecution as a
consequence of the hatred fomented in society by such speech. These
increased levels of discrimination also do significant harm to the broader
constitutional system, by undermining the democratic principles of equality
* Professor, WashburnUniversity School of Law, B.A. (R.M.C.), J.D. (Univ. of Toronto), LL.M.
(Osaka Univ.), S.J.D. (Univ. of Pennsylvania). This article was developed out of a much shorter chapter,
Laws Without Sanctions: Hate Sp eech Laws and the Balancing ofRights in Japan, in 1 {t H * 0) &
W [THE LEGAL PROCESS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: ITS STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS] (Keiichi
Ageishi et al. eds., 2017), substantially expanded to provide more robust comparative and theoretical
analysis of the tension between rights posed by hate speech laws. I would like to thank Setsuo Miyazawa
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1. See infra notes 38 and 174-181 and accompanying text.
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and inclusiveness, and ironically by undermining freedom of expression
itself, as the members of target groups are cowed into silence.2
Efforts to prevent such harm through the imposition of legal limits on
this form of hate speech, however, would likely impinge upon the
constitutional right to freedom of expression. Freedom of speech is viewed
as a fundamental individual right in most democratic constitutional systems
and is a right that international human rights law obliges states to guarantee,
respect, and enforce. It is difficult to conceive of an approach to the
prohibition of hate speech that would not constitute a government
suppression of political expression based on its content or even its viewpoint,
not just its form or its effects. Such content-based limitation on political
speech is viewed with the greatest suspicion, and in the context of judicial
review, the justification of this kind of limitation on the constitutional right
of freedom of expression is difficult (though by no means impossible). This
is because the regulation of political speech is seen as being inimical to the
most fundamental values at the core of the right to freedom of expression,
and as doing considerable violence to principles thought essential to the
operation of a free and democratic society.
We are thus confronted with two threats or potential harms to important
values. If we take the harm of hate speech seriously, we must accept that it
poses a threat to democratic values, and as will be argued here, even
undermines constitutional rights. But to suppress hate speech similarly risks
causing significant harm to constitutional rights and democratic principles.
The challenge faced by constitutional democracies, therefore, is determining
how to reconcile these competing imperatives, how to resolve this tension.
Where to draw the line, how to find the right balance? Upon further
reflection, and an examination of the approaches in different countries, we
might further ask what, exactly, are we even trying to balance? For a
comparative review of different approaches to the problem of hate speech
suggests that different countries are trying to balance different things.
This Article uses the occasion of Japan's enactment of hate speech
legislation in 2016, the latest effort by a democratic system to grapple with
the problem, to engage in a comparative examination of three very different
approaches to resolving the tensions outlined above. The Article explores
the purpose and scope of hate speech related laws, and the manner in which
such laws have been judicially reviewed, in Japan, the United States, and
Canada. It does so with a view to better understanding the different ways in
which the balance might be struck and assessing whether there may be an
optimal approach to achieving some equilibrium. There are significant
2. See infra notes 38 and 174-181 and accompanying text.
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differences in all aspects of the approaches of the three systems. To begin
with the legislative approach, the purported object and purpose, the mischief
targeted, and the breadth and scope of the expression contemplated by hate
speech related laws, are all quite different. With respect to the judicial
approaches, how such law has been characterized and interpreted by
respective judiciaries, and the constitutional doctrine that the law is subject
to in judicial review, is also strikingly different. Identifying and reflecting
upon some of these marked differences can assist in thinking about what
formulation of hate speech law might be justified as a reasonable limitation
on freedom of expression, as well as what adjustment to constitutional
doctrine might be required to make such justification formally possible.
There is, however, a singular and more fundamental difference that
emerges from an examination of the Japanese and American approaches
through the lens provided by the Canadian example. This difference is in the
extent to which hate speech laws are understood to relate to the constitutional
right to equal treatment and not to be discriminated against. As we will see,
the Canadian legislatures and courts both quite explicitly recognize that the
purpose of hate speech law is to advance the equal protection and equal
benefit of law that are provided for in Section 15 in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.3 It is precisely for this reason that the overriding
concern, and the explicit object and purpose of hate speech laws, is to prevent
discrimination. The Canadian system thus tends to view the justification of
hate speech laws in terms of striking a compromise or balance between the
constitutional rights to equality and to freedom of expression. This is very
much in line with the manner in which international human rights law, as
reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR")4 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD"),5 quite explicitly requires states
to both implement hate speech laws for purposes of furthering the right to
equality, and to nonetheless respect and enforce the right to freedom of
expression. This is in marked contrast to both the Japanese and American
approaches, which do not tend to recognize that hate speech laws implicate
in any way the constitutional provisions providing for equal protection and
the right not to be discriminated against.
3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, section 15(1) (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter of Rights and
Freedoms].
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 20(2), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (entry into force Mar. 23, 1976).
5. International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
[hereinafter CERD] (entry into force Jan. 4, 1969).
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It is in this sense, then, that we find that the different approaches to hate
speech law are trying to balance different things. In the Japanese and
American approaches, the balance is between the fundamental constitutional
right to freedom of expression on the one hand, and mere legislation on the
other. Put slightly differently, it is a balance between harms to constitutional
values and principles on the one hand, and on the other hand sociological
harms that hate speech legislation seeks to address, but which are not
recognized by the courts as being very grave. Not surprisingly, the line tends
to get drawn in favor of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. In
the Canadian approach, however, the balance to be struck is explicitly
recognized as being one between competing fundamental constitutional
rights, and the harms at issue on both sides of the equation implicate and
threaten constitutional values and principles. As will be explored below,
Canada does not necessarily draw the line in the right place in terms of how
far to limit expression, but I would argue that it is at least striking the right
balance-in the sense that it is at least balancing the right things and
recognizing that the tension created by hate speech law is between two
constitutional rights.
The argument that the "right balance" requires or constitutes a
recognition that hate speech law implicates the constitutional right to equal
treatment and protection, thereby creating a tension between two constitutional
rights, finds support from certain features that are common to the doctrine
governing constitutional judicial review across most systems. That is to say,
the analytical framework of the doctrine is such that recognition of hate speech
as implicating equality rights naturally gives rise to an internally coherent
approach that both minimizes the law's impact on freedom of expression and
shapes it in a manner that maximizes its probability of surviving judicial
review across many systems-even that of the United States. If hate speech
laws are understood to fulfill the purpose of the right to equal protection, there
comes into view not only a constitutionally informed objective and purpose,
which will obviously serve as a compelling state interest, but also a ready-
made set of limiting principles that help to more precisely define the very
narrow scope and tailored limits for the legislation. These internal limits will
be explicitly informed by the constitutionally prohibited grounds of
discrimination. The law that arises from this approach provides a much
stronger basis for justifying as reasonable the resulting infringement of
freedom of expression. The comparative perspective helps to provide answers
to many of the concerns that are typically raised in respect of the breadth of
hate speech laws and the injury they do to freedom of speech. Ultimately, I
will suggest hat hate speech laws along such lines, that are drawn as narrowly
[Vol. 45:34589
as the Canadian Criminal Code provision6 (but perhaps not as broadly as some
of the Canadian human rights code provisions), can indeed be upheld as a
reasonable and justifiable limitation on the right to freedom of expression.
Before launching into the comparative examination, however, we
should pause to consider what, precisely, we mean by "hate speech," and
thus what should be prohibited or constrained by so-called hate speech laws,
subject to freedom of speech considerations. The answer to this question is,
of course, dependent on some of the other aspects of the problem with which
we will grapple below, and so to answer that question here may in some ways
seem to predetermine the normative arguments to follow. But it is
nonetheless important to provide some preliminary observations on this
point. As explained in more detail below, the Canadian system characterizes
hate speech as expression that, in form and content, will likely foster hatred
and contempt for individuals who are identified as belonging to groups based
on such shared personal characteristics as race, ethnicity, creed, religion, or
gender ("identifiable groups"), thereby causing not only emotional and
psychological harm to them, but also making discrimination and persecution
of the targeted identifiable groups more likely.7 This is consistent with the
approach reflected in international human rights law.' On this view, the
more extreme kind of hate speech that should be of concern in democratic
societies, is that which vilifies, denigrates, alienates, delegitimizes and even
attempts to dehumanize the members of identifiable groups-groups that
often have been historically the subject of negative stereotyping, prejudice,
and discrimination. And of gravest concern, and therefore the subject of
possible legal limitation and constraint, is such expression that takes the most
extreme form, through the use of epithets, historic symbols of hatred and
terror such as the Swastika or a burning cross, and the use of dehumanizing
animal metaphors for members of the group.9
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first three that follow this
introduction examine the approaches of Japan, the United States, and
Canada, and I should note that they do so on the assumption that readers will
likely be well acquainted with one or perhaps two of these systems, but not
all three-they are all, therefore, written in part for those who may not know
the system well. Part I provides an examination of the new hate speech law
regime in Japan, analyzing the new legislation, why it was developed, and
how it should be understood within the context of Japan's historic approach
6. See infra notes 38 and 174-181 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38 and 174-181 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 47-52, 185, and 229-231 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 174-181, 200-207 and accompanying text.
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to the constitutional rights to equality and freedom of speech. In Part II the
Article examines how the American system has grappled with hate speech,
exploring in particular how judicial decisions have considered hate speech
laws within different and ill-fitting doctrinal categories of lesser-protected
speech as a means of assessing their constitutionality. The Article turns in
Part III to examine the Canadian approach, in terms of both the criminal aw
and human rights code provisions limiting hate speech. In this part I explain
how, in contrast to the Japanese and American approaches, both the
legislatures and the courts have recognized explicitly that hate speech law
has the object and purpose of fulfilling the guarantee of equal protection
provided for in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Finally, in Part IV, I
explore in more detail the lessons to be drawn from this comparative review,
beginning with an explanation of why hate speech law should be recognized
as implicating the constitutional right to equal protection, and how such a
recognition leads to laws that are naturally limited by constitutional
principles, and more easily justified as a reasonable impingement on the right
to freedom of expression. The comparative analysis suggests the right
balance can be struck by recognizing the tension as between two
fundamental constitutional rights or values and taking seriously the harm that
can be caused by hate speech.
I. The New Hate Speech Law Regime in Japan
We begin the comparative review with a discussion of the recent
introduction of hate speech legislation in Japan and analyze how that fits into
a broader constitutional approach to equality rights and freedom of speech.
First, however, that legislation must be put into some perspective by
explaining the developments that led a reluctant government to enact this
hate speech law, and by examining the legal remedies available for
addressing hate speech prior to the legislation.
A. The Call for Hate Speech Laws in Japan
There have been calls in Japan for human rights legislation and
antidiscrimination protections for many decades now.'0 But the more recent
10. I also explore these issues, in the context of a comparative examination of constitutional
equality rights in Japan, in Craig Martin, Glimmers of Hope: The Evolution of Equality Rights
Doctrine in Japanese Courts from a Comparative Perspective, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 167,
176-78 (2010); for these issues in the context of hate speech, see Shigenori Matsui, The Challenge
to Multiculturalism: Hate Speech Ban in Japan, 49 UBC L. REv. 427 (2016) [hereinafter Matsui,
Hate Speech]; for an excellent and detailed analysis of social justice litigation, though now
somewhat dated, see FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987); and
see also Timothy Webster, Insular Minorities: International Law's Challenge to Japan's Ethnic
Homogeneity, 36 N.C. J. INT'L & CoMM. REG. 557 (2011).
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and earnest appeals for the enactment of hate speech laws began in 2012, in
response to an increase in the incidence of anti-Korean rallies and
demonstrations. There are over half a million people in Japan who are of
Korean descent and who do not have Japanese nationality. They are mostly
descendants of immigrants from Korea who were stripped of their Japanese
nationality after World War II. While they are third and fourth generation
descendants of those initially brought to Japan when Korea was part of the
Japanese Empire, and who were thus born and raised in Japan, they retain
either North or South Korean nationality, depending on where their
forefathers came from, and have a special permanent resident status (similar
to descendants of Taiwanese in Japan, who were similarly stripped of their
nationality after the war). Indeed, some are effectively stateless as a matter
of international law, even though registered as being North Korean under
Japanese law." The internal dynamics of this community are complex, and
those of Northern and Southern Korean identity each suffer different forms
and degrees of discrimination, but I will here refer to them collectively as
Korean-Japanese.12  Several of the rallies against Korean-Japanese were
videotaped and received considerable publicity, including one in particular
which featured a young girl screaming that Koreans should be massacred,
among other things.13 The protests were characterized by speeches and
chants that included highly discriminatory and hateful invective aimed at
Korean-Japanese persons. Several of the protests were held outside of
Korean-Japanese schools, and so subjected young children to abusive verbal
attacks. The first ever government study of the issue in 2015 found that there
were 347 protests and demonstrations in 2013, and a total of close to 1,200
11. Matsui, Hate Speech, supra note 10, at 443.
12. The term often used is "Korea residents," as a translation of the typically used Japanese
terms I H t A [South Korean in Japan] and iT H ) UA [North Korean in Japan], but I do not
think the term "Korean residents" really captures the essence of who these people are and their
status within Japan, as it does not distinguish between the third- and fourth-generation Koreans,
most of whom cannot speak Korean and have never even been to the Peninsula, and those South
Koreans who actually are just visiting or have recently immigrated to Japan. There is a huge
literature on the Korean-Japanese community and the discrimination issues the community faces.
See, e.g., CHANGSOO LEE & GEORGE DE Vos, KOREANS IN JAPAN: ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
ACCOMMODATION (1981); Yasuaki Onuma, Interplay Between Human Rights Activities and Legal
Standards of Human Rights: A Case Study on the Korean Minority in Japan, 25 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 515 (1992); tk BfKF, 'B H AU)S [ A4 [YASUAKI ONUMA, THE
NATIONALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN] (2004).
13. Japan's First-Ever Hate Speech Probe Finds Rallies Fewer but Still a Problem, JAPAN
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2016. See Jeremy Heard, Far-right Hate Speech against Koreans (Osaka, Japan),
YOUTUBE (July 10, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gt6tRLgtBxY&feature-youtu.be
(showing examples of such anti-Korea protests on YouTube).
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between April 2012 and September 2015.'4 This is likely a conservative
estimate, and the number of instances of lower levels or more individual
forms of hate speech is likely several multiples of this number. But these
large and widely publicized protests attracted attention, particularly in Tokyo
and Osaka, where there are large Korean-Japanese communities.
The uptick in discriminatory and hostile attitudes towards Korean-
Japanese in the early part of the decade was likely, in part, due to increased
tensions with both North and South Korea, following the death of Kim Jong
II of North Korea at the end of 2011, and the Liberal Democratic Party
("LDP") return to power in 2012. A combination of North Korean nuclear
weapons ambitions, territorial disputes over uninhabited islands with South
Korea, and the ongoing friction over how to resolve the Japanese wartime
sex-slave issue (euphemistically referred to in Japan as the "Comfort
Women" issue), increased tensions between Japan and the Koreas. This, in
turn, inflamed attitudes towards the Korean-Japanese community. The first
initiative to enact national legislation was actually taken by the Democratic
Party of Japan during its short stint in government, but when the LDP returned
to power it somewhat reluctantly responded with a draft bill of its own.15
The public profile of the issue was also further raised by a number of
lawsuits against such anti-Korean groups as the Zaitokutai, for their conduct
in protests against Korean-Japanese groups and institutions.16 But while
several of these lawsuits were quite successful, obtaining damages in a
handful of cases and even an injunction in a couple of high profile cases,7
these cases also illustrated precisely why hate speech legislation is necessary.
This is because in the absence of any hate speech law-that is, legislation
that actually prohibits the expression of racist statements designed to foster
hatred against minority groups such as the Korean-Japanese-other g ounds
for legal proceedings have to be found in either the criminal or civil law.
And there are no such grounds that can be applied to limit or punish harmful
14. Japan's First-Ever Hate Speech Probe Finds Rallies Fewer but Still a Problem, supra
note 13. See also &WW, -4I '2L- A$r M, 3 } zi 28 4
[Ministry of Justice, Hate Report on the Inquiry into the Situation Regarding Hate Speech, Mar.
2016], http://www.moj.go jp/content/001201158.pdf (last visited Feb. 2018).
15. Mizuho Aoki, Opposition Slams LDP in Pushing Antidiscrimination Bill, JAPAN TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2015; Japan to Enact Bill to Counter Hate Speech, JAPAN TIMES, May 11, 2016.
16. Zaitokutai is the abbreviated name of the E W il f [the
Association of Citizens Against the Special Rights of Koreans in Japan]. See Zaitokukai Ordered
to Pay Damages for Defaming Korean Resident of Japan, JAPAN TIMEs, Sept. 27, 2016 (reporting
on a decision by the Osaka District Court). The Kyoto District Court awarded damages against the
Zaitokutai in 2013.
17. [Yokohama Dist. Ct., Kawasaki Branch], June 2, 2016, Hie 28(wo) No. 42; see also
Tomohiro Osaki, Japanese Court Issues First-Ever Injunction Against Hate-Speech Rally, JAPAN
TIMES, June 3, 2016 (reporting on a decision by the Yokohama District Court).
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statements made against identifiable groups in general, as opposed to attacks
on specific individuals or institutions.
This point is illustrated nicely in what are commonly referred to as the
Kyoto North Korean School cases, which involved separate criminal and civil
proceedings against the Zaitokutai. The cases related to a series of protests by
the Zaitokutai against a school in Kyoto for Korean-Japanese of North Korean
heritage. The protests were particularly virulent, causing distress to young
children in the school, and the demonstrations also caused damage to school
facilities. At the request of the school the government prosecuted members of
the Zaitokutai for forcible obstruction of business under Article 234 of the
Criminal Code, damage to property under Article 261, and for criminal insult
under Article 231. At the same time, the school commenced civil proceedings
against members of the Zaitokutai for damages in tort, for defamation and
insult, as provided for in the Civil Code. Both the criminal and the civil
proceedings ultimately ended up at the Supreme Court, and the school
prevailed in both, winning twelve million yen (approximately $100,000) in
damages and a restraining order in the civil case.'
The decision of the court of first instance in the civil proceeding
garnered a great deal of attention because the court invoked and relied upon
the CERD, an international human rights treaty that imposed obligations on
Japan to provide protections from racial discrimination (I will return to
review provisions of the CERD in more detail below).19 Specifically, the
court held that the conduct and statements of the Zaitokutai came within the
definition of discrimination in the CERD, which in turn provided the basis
for finding liability for the tort of defamation.20 This reliance upon the
CERD was seen as quite extraordinary by some commentators, and as a
reason for some optimism regarding the judicial approach to hate speech.2 1
But the very same commentators also note that both the criminal and the civil
18. The criminal cases: [Kyoto Dist. Ct.], April 21, 2011, Hei 22(wa) no. 1257 and Hei 22
(wa) no. 1641; [Osaka High Ct.], Oct. 28, 2011, Hei 23 (u) no. 788; [Sup. Ct.], Feb. 23, 2012, Hei
(a) no. 2009; and civil case: [Kyoto Dist. Ct.], Oct. 7, 2013, Hei 22 (wa) no. 2655, 2208 HANREI
JIHO [HANJI] 74 (Japan); [Osaka High Ct], July 8, 2014, Hei 25 (ne) no. 3235; [Sup. Ct.], Dec. 9,
2014, Hei 26 (o) no. 1539, Hei 26 (ju) no. 1974.
19. CERD, supra note 5.
20. [Kyoto Dist. Ct.], Oct. 7, 2013, Hei 22 (wa) no. 2655, 2208 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 74
(Japan).
21. For discussion of the case in English, see Junko Kotani, A Comment on Hate Speech
Regulation in Japan After the Enactment ofthe Hate Speech Elimination Act of2016, 21 SHIZUOKA
J.L. & POL. 1, 6-7 (2017); Matsui, Hate Speech, supra note 10, at 450-51; Ayako Hatano, Can
Strategic Human Rights Litigation Complement Social Movements? A Case Study of the Anti-Hate
Speech Movement in Japan, U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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grounds for this case are very much limited to statements and conduct
directed toward and against specific individuals and institutions. These
offenses and causes of action cannot be the basis for either prosecuting or
suing anyone for statements intended to f ster hatred generally against an
identifiable group, no matter how hateful and racist the statements may be.2 2
Indeed, the Kyoto District Court itself made clear in its judgment that there
could be liability only when the hateful speech was directed towards specific
persons or associations.23 And so, in short, without hate speech legislation, the
current criminal and civil codes can only provide redress for hate speech that can
be characterized as defamation, insult, or threats against specific persons.
This was the context in which the government finally and reluctantly
enacted the current hate speech legislation, which, as we will see below,
neither prohibits hate speech nor punishes it. But before examining the
legislation itself, it is perhaps worth noting how the law implicates a more
general debate about Japanese law-worth noting because certain
perspectives from this debate may indeed inform the critique of the new hate
speech legislation. The debate relates to the manner in which Japanese laws,
even criminal laws, often have either very minimal sanctions, or often no
punishment at all. Some Western scholars have argued that Japanese law is
successful precisely because it relies on methods other than formal sanction
in order to mobilize compliance.24 John Haley is perhaps most identified
with this theory. He famously argued that one of the functions of this weak
form of law was to itself create and shape positive social norms. In his view,
Japanese criminal law was a significant factor in explaining Japan's
relatively low crime rate and low recidivism rate, precisely because of this
relatively weak formal enforcement and sanctions regime, and reliance upon
informal societal norms and institutions to mobilize compliance.25
Moreover, this was evidence for an observation that Japanese law more
generally, as compared to Western legal systems, often mobilizes
compliance through the influencing of informal societal norms rather than
through the formal imposition of sanctions.26
Many Japanese scholars, such as Setsuo Miyazawa, have argued that
these explanations tend to miss some of the negative aspects and
22. Kotani, supra note 21, at 7; Matsui, Hate Speech, supra note 10, at 452.
23. [Kyoto Dist. Ct.], October 7, 2013, Hei 22 (wa) no. 2655, 2208 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 74
(Japan); Kotani, supra note 21, at 7.
24. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX
(1991); JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998).
25. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 24, at 138; HALEY, SPIRIT OF
JAPANESE LAW, supra note 24, at 88-89.
26. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 24, at 138-140.
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ramifications of such leniency. They do not dispute the descriptive accuracy
of Haley's observation that Japanese law is often comparatively lenient, but
they challenge the normative implications. Miyazawa, for instance, has
argued that these efforts to explain some of the apparently successful aspects
of Japanese law as being the result of the law's weak sanctions and
enforcement regime, helped to obscure other serious problems within the
legal system. In short, they argued that the lack of enforcement mechanisms
and sanctions in Japanese laws can often disguise and sometimes even
contribute to a disregard for, and even a direct violation of, fundamental
individual rights.27 This of course plays out in different ways in different
areas of Japanese law. In the area of human rights, however, the apparent
leniency and lack of enforcement of what human rights law exists, operates
to negatively affect he very people the law should be protecting. As will be
discussed below, there has been a persistent failure to develop legislation
that not only defines and prohibits the violation of fundamental rights (such
as the rights of minorities not to be discriminated against), but when laws are
contemplated or enacted, they generally lack any meaningful sanctions and
remedies in the event of a breach. As such this leniency towards perpetrators
of harm has contributed to the continued systemic violation of the rights of
minorities, the people the law is supposed to protect.28
The recent hate speech laws reflect this paradigm. The legislation was
passed to ostensibly protect minorities, particularly members of the large
Korean-Japanese community in Japan, in the face of rising levels of virulent
hate speech that will likely contribute to increased discrimination, and possibly
even persecution and violence. Yet the laws lack any form of sanction or
mechanisms of enforcement. They thus leave the vulnerable group exposed
and unprotected, notwithstanding that the very enactment of the law
acknowledges their plight. What is more, the passage of the law may create a
false sense that action is being taken to protect the vulnerable, thus helping
mask the continued violations, and provide an excuse for taking no further
action. Indeed, Frank Upham has argued that it has been a typical stratagem
of Japanese governments in the past to pass toothless legislation in response to
civic unrest and social rights litigation, as a means of defusing the situation
and dividing the opposition.29 In this sense, the hate speech laws tend to provide
27. Others have argued that Haley's analysis overstates the extent to which Japanese law is
comparatively lenient or bereft of power. See, e.g., David T. Johnson, Review Essay, Authority
with Power: Haley on Japan's Law and Politics, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 619 (1993).
28. See infra notes 47-66 and associated text.
29. UPHAM, supra note 10; and comments of Frank Upham at the American Association of
Law Schools Annual Conference, San Diego, Jan. 4, 2018.
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yet another example of the problem that Miyazawa addressed, and illustrates
how lenient laws in Japan can at times facilitate the violation of rights.
B. The Hate Speech Legislation
The government finally enacted a law on hate speech in May 2016.30
During the debate of the bill in the Diet it was roundly criticized as being
excessively narrow as well as toothless, and yet it was further weakened
during the process of debate and revision. In the end, the law comprised of
only seven short articles, and it is indeed deserving of some hard questions.
To begin, it notes in the preamble that there has been a rise in discriminatory
speech and behavior in recent years, and "declares that such unfair
discriminatory speech and behavior will not be tolerated," and that the law
was enacted to "spread awareness among the general public . .. to strengthen
efforts to eliminate unfair discriminatory speech and behavior."31 This is all
very general and hortatory, and the remaining articles, under the heading
"Basic Measures" (which are presumably designed to help achieve these
vague aspirations), are similarly vapid. Article Five contemplates the
national and local governments establishing some form of unspecified
consultation system for victims of hate speech, which is to help "prevent and
resolve disputes in this regard."32 Article Six requires the national and local
governments to implement educational activities to help eliminate hate
speech. Article Seven requires both national and local governments to
"spread awareness among the general public about the need to eliminate"
hate speech, and to "implement public relations activities for the purpose of
furthering understanding" of this need.33 That is it. There is no actual
prohibition of either the creation or the dissemination of hate speech, nor any
sanctions whatsoever for the communication of hate speech. Indeed, the law
never addresses the perpetrators of hate speech directly at all-all of the
provisions are directed to imposing obligations on the national and local
governments to raise awareness and understanding within society, and on the
general public at large to improve its understanding of the issues. The law
f, http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001184402.pdf (last visited Feb. 2018). The law came into force
on June 3, 2016, as Law No. 68, 2016; an English translation, The Act on the Promotion of Efforts
to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech and Behavior against Persons Originating from Outside
Japan (provisional translation), http://www.moj.go jp/ENGLISHjmjinkenO4_00001.html (last
visited Feb. 2017) [hereinafter Discriminatory Speech Law].
31. Discriminatory Speech Law, supra note 30, at preamble.
32. Id. at art. 5.
33. Id. at art. 6-7.
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is not directed at, nor does it even refer to, the individuals or entities engaging
in the communication of hate speech. It is for this reason that there has been
such criticism of the law as being ineffectual.34
The other cause for criticism of the new law is that it defines hate speech
in a manner that is both vague and yet excessively narrow. Article One of
the law defines the subject of the law as "unfair discriminatory speech and
behavior against persons originating from outside of Japan."3 5 It goes on to
define each of the elements of this clause. Unfair discriminatory speech and
behavior is defined as "discriminatory speech and behavior to incite the
exclusion... from the local community ... [by] openly announcing to the
effect of harming the life, body, freedom, reputation or property of, or to
significantly insult" such persons from outside of Japan.36 The addition of
"significantly insult" was only added at the last minute, and without it the
definition could have been construed even more narrowly to only that speech
that threatens to harm the life, person, liberty, property or reputation of the
targets of such speech.37 But even as it stands now, it is not clear that the
definition is really trying to prevent the kind of speech that can foster hatred
and discrimination against minorities. Indeed, it is not entirely clear
precisely what kind of speech is contemplated. As will be discussed below,
the literature on hate speech and the jurisprudence in other countries
recognizes that there is significant harm to minorities caused by speech that
vilifies, denigrates, demeans, and even dehumanizes identifiable groups
within society, and thereby fosters hatred, prejudice, and increased
discrimination against visible minorities within a society. Such speech need
not (though it may) rise to the level of threatening their life, body, freedom,
or property in order to cause this significant harm.38
34. Mizuho Aoki, Opposition Slams LDP in Pushing Antidiscrimination Bill, JAPAN TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2015, https://www japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/06/national/politics-diplomacy/opp
osition-slams-ldp-pushing-antidiscrimination-bill/; Japan to Enact Bill to Counter Hate Speech,
JAPAN TIMES, May 11, 2016; see generally t Fi$&, F-4 b
J: 3A 0 n 0 v v [SHINJI HIGAKI, A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATION OF HATE
SPEECH REGULATION: THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION DILEMMA] (2017); ri) I IE A, F*AO.
n A0 L 7 , Ati$M 2015t2-9 (360 T) [Masato Ichikawa, Freedom
ofExpression and Hate Speech, 2:360 RITSUMEIKANHOGAKU 122 (2015)]; Matsui, Hate Speech,
supra note 10.
35. Discriminatory Speech Law, supra note 30, at art. 1 (Japan).
36. Discriminatory Speech Law, supra note 30, at art. 1 (Japan).
37. See infra Part II-B for discussion of the "fighting words" and "incitement o violence"
categories in American freedom of speech doctrine.
38. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE
SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); JEREMY WALDRON, THE
HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012); HIGAKI, supra note 34; Richard Delgado, Words that Wound, 17
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The second element of the definition, the term "persons from outside of
Japan," was defined as "persons originating exclusively from a country or
region other than Japan or their descendants and who are lawfully residing
in Japan."39 The first major criticism is that the law thereby only purports to
be concerned with protecting foreigners, or their descendants. The focus on
foreigners and their descendants likely reflects the fact that much of the
controversy over hate speech in recent years has been driven by
discrimination against members of the Korean-Japanese community. In one
sense the law, while ostensibly for the protection of members of the Korean-
Japanese community, with its exclusive focus on "foreigners" merely serves
to further emphasize the alienation and foreignness of a people who have
been in Japan for generations. But it also clearly excludes and ignores some
other important identifiable groups within Japan, most obviously members
of the Burakumin and Ainu communities, who have for generations been the
victims of systemic discrimination, including hate speech.40 What is more,
by further limiting the scope of the law to only those foreigners who are
"lawfully in Japan," the law tends to signal to society that hateful
communication is acceptable if directed at refugee claimants or other
foreigners who have overstayed their visa term, or whose immigration status
is otherwise not valid. This would include a large percentage of the
thousands of children of uncertain parentage who have been born and raised
in Japan, but have been denied Japanese nationality, and many of whom are
stateless.4' The Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees, among other groups,
were critical of the new law for this very reason.42 Thus, in short, by
definition the law only purports to address speech directed against a narrow
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate
Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis ofAmerican and Canadian Approaches to the Regulation ofHate
Speech, 1994 Wisc. L. REv. 1425 (1994); for foreign jurisprudence, see, e.g., R. v. Keegstra [1990]
3 S.C.R. 697 (Supreme Court of Canada); for research on the harms and effects of hate speech and
incitement at the international level, see RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, INCITEMENT ON TRIAL:
PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL SPEECH CRIMES (2017).
39. Discriminatory Speech Law, supra note 30, at art. 1.
40. For discussion of the Burakumin issues, see, e.g., Japan Federation of Bar Associations,
"Japan Federation of Bar Associations Report on Response to the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Report of the Japanese Government of the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination," Mar. 19, 2014, at 72-83 [hereinafter JFBA Report].
41. See, e.g., Chen Tien-shi, Statelessness in Japan: Management and Challenges, 21 J.
POPULATION AND SOC. STUD. 70 (2012).
42. Tomohiro Osaki, Diet Debates Hate-Speech Bill That Activists Call Narrow and Toothless,
JAPAN TiMES, Apr. 19, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/19/national/politics-
diplomacy/diet-debates-hate-speech-bill-activists-call-narrow-toothless/#.WlkiMKhKvD4.
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subset of vulnerable identifiable minorities within Japan; and primarily
addresses speech that threatens harm against the life, person, liberty,
property, or reputation of such persons. And in substance, the law does not
actually prohibit or prescribe any punishment for such speech.
In addition to this legislation, there have been moves to enact municipal
or prefectural ordinances aimed at limiting hate speech. Indeed, some might
argue that the enactment of the national legislation helped provide the
impetus for these developments at the regional level. But some of the local
efforts predated the national government initiative, and so the influence may
well have run in the other direction. Or they both may have been a response
to increased pressure to deal with a problem that was gaining more
prominence. Osaka, for instance, promulgated an ordinance that came into
effect in July 2016, which both defined hate speech more broadly and
provided for greater enforcement mechanisms than the government
legislation.43 It defined hate speech as any communication that defames and
aims to exclude a particular group based on race or ethnicity, and
disseminates such information to large numbers of people through such
media as the internet. It included a complaints process, with a panel
established to consider complaints, and vested with the power to take such
action as publishing the names of those found to have engaged in hate
speech, and request internet servers to remove offending material from client
websites.44 But here too, the ordinance lacks the typical form of legal
sanctions available to local governments, such as the levying of fine. The
lack of sanctions notwithstanding, the naming and shaming contemplated by
the Osaka ordinance would, it has been suggested, provide the basis for
municipal authorities to subsequently deny offending groups the licenses and
approvals necessary to hold demonstrations and rallies in public areas, and
make it difficult for such groups to rent other facilities from private
companies.45 In this way it might provide some check against the conduct
of anti-Korean groups.
43. )OVrI 4 1 7 i [Osaka City Ordinance on Treatment
of Hate Speech], Osaka City Ordinance No. 1, Jan. 18, 2016 (Japan), unofficial translation available
in Koji Higashikawa, Japan 's Hate Speech Laws: Translations of the Osaka City Ordinance and
the National Act to Curb Hate Speech in Japan, 19 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. (2017), and an
unofficial translation by the Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center is also available online
at https://www.hurights.or jp/archives/racism-elimination/osaka city hate%20speech _ordinance
english.pdf; see also, Eric Johnston, Osaka Enforces Japan 's First Ordinance Against Hate
Speech, Threatens to Name Names, JAPAN TIMEs, July 1, 2016, https://www.japan times.co.jp/
news/2016/07/0 1/national/crime-legal/osaka-enforces-japans-first-ordinance-hate-speech-threaten
s-name-names/#.WlkioahKvD4.
44. Osaka City Ordinance on Treatment of Hate Speech, supra note 43.
45. Johnston, supra note 43.
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It is still too early to tell, given that the new law was enacted little more
than a year ago, but some might be inclined to think that it may have a
positive impact. It has been argued, for instance, that the Osaka court
decision ordering an injunction against an anti-Korean protest in the summer
of 2016 may have been influenced by the new law and indicates that the new
hate speech law ill have a positive influence on the future judicial treatment
of hate speech. That is, that the law, and particularly its definition of
"discriminatory speech and behavior," could help shape the manner in which
courts interpret and apply various other relevant laws that may provide a civil
cause of action. Thus, according to this argument, while the hate speech law
itself provides for no sanctions or penalties against the perpetrators of hate
speech, or any remedies for the victims of hate speech, it may nonetheless
bolster and make possible lawsuits grounded in tort and other legal
regimes.46 This, of course, plays into Haley's famous and favorable
interpretation of how Japanese laws exercise authority even while declining
to exert or enforce the power of the state. But I would suggest hat this is
altogether too optimistic a view when the legislation is placed into a larger
context. The entire effort needs to be considered within a broader
understanding of both equality rights and freedom of expression in Japan.
C. Equality Rights and Discrimination
Hate speech is only one small slice of the kind of discrimination that
minorities in Japan face. And in contrast to the narrowly defined category
of persons protected by the hate speech law, those who face systematic
discrimination in Japan include: foreigners generally, as well as Korean-
Japanese, Taiwanese-Japanese (another significant community of people
who, like Korean-Japanese, are second, third- or fourth-generation residents
of Japan); the Burakumin; the Ainu; the Ryukyu; racial and ethnic minorities;
persons of Japanese descent who have immigrated from Brazil and Peru;
children born to persons out of wedlock; the disabled; persons with such
diseases and health conditions as HIV/AIDS, Hanson's Disease, and even
epilepsy; and women, to name only the most prominent. The United Nations
Human Rights Committee, the institutional body that oversees the
implementation and enforcement of the ICCPR, has for decades criticized
Japan for its failure to develop laws and institutions to prohibit
discrimination and to provide a legal framework enabling victims to seek
redress. As recently as 2014, the Human Rights Committee, in its
46. Kotani, Comment on Hate Speech, supra note 21, at 10.
47. ICCPR, supra note 4.
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"Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Japan," reiterated
its concerns.8 It pointedly noted that Japan had not yet acted to address
many of the concerns expressed by the Committee in the past. In particular,
it noted that the rights provided for in the ICCPR, including the right to
equality and not to be discriminated against, were not generally protected or
justiciable in Japanese courts, and that Japan had still not developed any
national human rights legislation or institutions. Indeed, the report noted
with particular regret that the Japanese government had abandoned an
attempt in 2012 to pass a bill establishing a new Human Rights Commission,
and that no further action had been attempted since.49 The report noted the
continued inequality and discrimination faced by women, foreigners, gays,
and lesbians, and rising levels of hate speech and discrimination directed
against minority groups such as Koreans, Chinese, Burakumin, and
indigenous peoples such as the Ainu and Ryukyu.o
Similarly, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
which is the institutional body that oversees the implementation and
enforcement of the CERD, has been consistently critical of Japan's failure to
respect and enforce the rights in the convention, since Japan acceded to the
Convention in 1995.51 The CERD imposes very specific obligations on
states in relation to hate speech, providing that:
Article 4. - States Parties condemn all propaganda and all
organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of
one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination
and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set
forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin,
and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including
the financing thereof;
48. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Japan,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/CO/6 (2014) [hereinafter HRC Report, 2014].
49. Id. at paras. 6-7.
50. Id. at paras. 8-12, 26-29.
51. CERD, supra note 5.
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(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and
incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such
organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national
or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.52
Japan registered a reservation to this article of the convention at the time
it acceded to it, limiting the scope of the obligation to the extent Japan found
it consistent with the constitutional right to freedom of expression. The
CERD Committee, however, has criticized Japan for failing to develop
specific and comprehensive laws prohibiting both direct and indirect racial
discrimination, in accordance with its obligations under Article Four of the
CERD, as well as its failure to establish national human rights institutions in
accordance with the Paris Principles.5 3 What is more, the CERD Committee
has consistently and repeatedly criticized Japan for maintaining its
reservation, arguing that the obligations under the CERD can be reconciled
with robust rights to freedom of expression.54
As should be quite clear from the description of the new hate speech
law above, it does not fulfill the obligations Japan would have under the
CERD but for the reservation. It does not constitute a law that "declares it
an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination . . .," nor does it
"declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination." It is
worth noting that it does not even appear to conform to the CERD definition
of racial discrimination in its own definition of hate speech. The CERD
defines "racial discrimination" quite broadly, as including "any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national
or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
52. CERD, supra note 5, at art. 4.
53. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations on the
Combined Seventh to Ninth Periodic Reports of Japan, U.N. Doc CERD/c/jpn/co/7-9, paras. 8-9
(2014) [hereinafter CERD Report 2014]; see also JFBA Report, supra note 40. The Paris Principles
were established at the first International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights in Paris, Oct. 7-9, 1991, and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
in Resolution 48/134 of 1993.
54. CERD Report 2014, supra note 53, at para. 10.
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and fundamental freedoms. ... "" The limitation of the new Japanese hate
speech law to expression directed at foreigners and their decedents lawfully
in Japan, does not begin to address the obligation in the CERD.
The CERD Committee, in its recent report on Japan, also reviewed the
continuing discrimination against foreigners, women, ethnic and racial
minorities, the Burakumin, the Ainu, Muslims, and other religious minorities,
among others. The Committee also, like the Human Rights Committee,
focused on the particular problem of hate speech and hate crimes. It noted
the increase in the incidence of hate speech and discriminatory behavior, and
criticized Japan for its failure to implement laws designed to protect
minorities from hate speech, to investigate and prosecute those who engage
in such conduct, and to punish public officials and politicians who
disseminate hate speech.56 And for those who may be inclined to dismiss the
criticisms of the institutions of international human rights law as being not
entirely relevant to a debate over the domestic laws of Japan, it should be
noted that the Constitution of Japan, in the chapter titled "Supreme Law,"
provides that treaties to which Japan is a party, in addition to customary
international law, "shall be faithfully observed."57 This provision has been
interpreted, by the government, the courts, and legal scholars, as meaning that
treaties to which Japan is a party are directly and automatically incorporated
as the law of the land, without requiring any implementing legislation, and
moreover such law prevails over any conflicting statutes.5 " This was indeed
the basis upon which the Kyoto District Court referred directly to the CERD
in the Kyoto North Korean School cases discussed above.
The repeated observations of the U.N. committees are just part of a
larger body of evidence that reflects the fairly well established fact that the
rights of minorities in Japan are not well protected by the legal system.59
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, even the constitutional right o equality
and not to be discriminated against, provided for in Article 14 of the
55. CERD, supra note 5, art. 1. It should be noted that art. 1(2) does provide that the definition
does not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences made by the state party
between citizens and noncitizens-so denying noncitizens the right to vote, for instance, does not
violate the convention.
56. CERD Report, supra note 53 , at paras. 10-11.
57. Constitution of Japan, 1947, art. 98, para. 2 (Japan).
58. See, e.g., YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE LAW
(1998), at 27, and chap. 3. The Japanese Supreme Court has also directly interpreted treaties. See,
e.g., 28Minshu 1331 (Sept. 26, 1974); 31Minshu 511 (June 28, 1977). Lowercourts have similarly
directly implemented provisions of the ICCPR. See IWASAWA, at 51c56.
59. See, e.g., JFBA report, supra note 40.
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Constitution of Japan, is not rigorously enforced by the judiciary.6 0 What is
more, there has been considerable reluctance on the part of successive
governments to establish legal protections against discrimination. During
the Socialist Party's brief turn as part of a coalition government in the 1990s,
a Law on the Promotion of Measures for Human Rights Protection was
developed, and finally enacted in 1996-the year after Japan acceded to the
CERD.6 1 It too lacked any prohibitions, sanctions, or enforcement
mechanisms, but it was seen as the first step towards developing a human
rights regime. But it was repealed in 2002, after the LDP returned to power.
In 2002 and again in 2005 the Diet considered but failed to enact new human
rights legislation.62  Similarly, a Human Rights Commission Bill was
developed in 2012, but it was allowed to die when the Diet was dissolved in
November, and never re-submitted for consideration.6 3
This reluctance is not unique to politicians at the national level. Local
governments, too, have been slow to enact ordinances to protect the equality
rights of minorities. What is more, those that have taken action on the issue
have often come under intense pressure to reverse course. In 2006, for
instance, Tottori Prefecture enacted an antidiscrimination human rights
ordinance, the Ordinance Regarding the Promotion and Procedure for the
Restitution for Human Rights Violations, only to be forced by conservative
groups and media outlets to revoke it.64 As mentioned above, some local
governments, such as that of Osaka, have more recently enacted hate speech
ordinances; however, there continues to be considerable skepticism and
suspicion regarding human rights legislation designed to protect minorities
from discrimination, particularly when the measures are viewed as primarily
benefiting Korean-Japanese individuals.
At best, this tends to indicate government indifference towards the
rights of minorities more generally. Thus, when examining the hate speech
law issue within that context, there is good reason to believe that the
government's approach simply does not take seriously the rights of victims
60. Martin, Glimmers ofHope, supra note 10.
61. Law No. 120, 1996.
62. A [HumanRights ProtectionBill], House of Representatives, 154th Session,
2002, http://www.moj.go jp/content/000104841.pdf. For discussion of this, see also Matsui, Hate
Speech, supra note 10, at 436-37.
63. A V W 4 [Human Rights Commission Bill], http://www.moj.go jp/content/
000104039.pdf. Reference is made to its demise in the CERD Report, supra note 53, para. 7, and
the HRC Report, supra note 48, at para. 9.
64. Debito Arudou, How to Kill a Bill: Tottori's Human Rights Ordinance is a Case in
Alarmism, JAPAN TIMES, May 2, 2006, https://www japantimes.co jp/community/2006/05/02/
issues/how-to-kill-a-bill/#.WmUyeZM-fOQ.
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of hateful expression, or the nature of harm that such speech is likely to
cause. There is little acknowledgement hat such expression is likely to
foster prejudice and incite discrimination.65 Moreover, there is little apparent
understanding that such speech may possibly cause even more harmful
behavior towards minorities, as well as have a broader negative impact on
the values of equality and tolerance in society.6 6
Now, viewed through the lens of Haley's "authority without power"
paradigm, one might argue that the hate speech law ill nonetheless help to
shape cultural and social norms by its mere enactment, and through the
awareness raising and educational programs that the law requires the
national and local governments to implement. Moreover, as mentioned
earlier, it may influence the courts in how they interpret and apply civil laws
giving rise to other causes of action, such as defamation, in law suits against
the perpetrators of hate speech. Over time these influences of the law will
operate to reduce the incidence of hate speech. Perhaps there is some merit
to such claims, but the jury will be out for some time before we know if that
is right. In the meantime, however, people will continue to suffer harm. And
the question has to be asked: why shy away from enacting real prohibitions
on a narrow band of hate speech, and establishing real sanctions for those
who engage in hateful communication that is likely to foster discrimination
and otherwise cause harm to identifiable minorities? The apparent leniency
towards the perpetrators of hate speech is at the expense of the victims,
whose rights are being discounted or even ignored. Japan has obligations
under international law, and arguably under the Constitution, to protect those
rights, and yet it has consistently resisted doing so. I say arguably because
of course Article 14 of the Constitution first and foremost governs the
relationship between the government and the individual, not between private
entities and the individual. But having said that, the courts have on occasion
interpreted labor law and other statutes in a manner that explicitly invokes
the requirement to conform with the values enshrined in Article 14.67 It is
65. Indeed, the government, in its periodic report to the CERD Committee, formally took the
position that it "does not believe that, in present-day Japan, racist thoughts are disseminated and
racial discrimination is incited, to the extent that the withdrawal of its reservations or legislation to
impose punishment against dissemination of racist thoughts and other acts should be considered
even at the risk of unduly stifling legitimate speech." Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Seventh to Ninth Combined Periodic Reports by the Government of Japan Under
Article 9, U.N. Doc CERD/C/JPN/7-9, para. 84 (2013).
66. For more on the harms caused by hate speech, see supra note 38.
67. See, e.g., Supreme Court Judgment (Mar. 24, 1981), 35 Minshii 2 300 (Nissan Motors
case) (holding that "a lower compulsory retirement age for women than for men constitutes
discrimination against women based solely on their gender and is irrational discrimination invalid
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arguable, therefore, that the government has an obligation under Article 14
not only to treat individual equally, but also to enact laws to ensure that "all
of the people" enjoy a right to equality and are not discriminated against in
their interactions with private entities and persons.
Considering the issue in the broader context of the failure to protect
minorities from discrimination more generally, it is difficult not to incline
towards rather unfortunate and negative conclusions regarding the likely
explanations for this reluctance.68 But the more positive explanation that is
typically offered by defenders of the government approach, is that it is for
reasons of protecting the right to freedom of expression. In other words, the
approach is actually motivated by an impulse to defend rights, not to ignore
or neglect them. And to be fair, the tension between hate speech and freedom
of speech has been a challenge for many constitutional systems, and so we
need to explore more closely the argument in the Japanese context.
D. Freedom of Expression
The strongest objection to a more rigorous and enforceable hate speech
law is that it can limit or violate the right to freedom of expression. This is
the objection that has been made by both politicians and public figures in
debate over the legislation, and indeed by scholars writing on the issue.69
The Constitution of Japan includes a robust right to freedom of expression
in Article 21, which provides that: "Freedom of assembly and association as
well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed. No
censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of
communication be violated.""
A law that prohibited certain forms of expression, based on the content
of that expression, would on its face appear to limit or infringe this right.
And, as mentioned earlier, when Japan acceded to the CERD in 1995, it
registered a reservation to the effect that:
In applying the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of article 4 of the
[said Convention] Japan fulfills the obligations under those provisions
to the extent that fulfillment of the obligations is compatible with the
under Article 90 of the Civil Code . . . Article 1-2"). For an English translation of this case, under
the title Nissan Motors, Inc. v. Nakamoto, see LAWRENCE W. BEER AND HIROSHI ITOH, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 (1996) at 179-8 1.
68. Others share this inclination. See, e.g., Matsui, Hate Speech, supra note 10, at 433-36.
69. For review of the debate, see, e.g., Ichikawa, supra note 34 and HIGAKI, supra note 34.
70. CONST. OF JAPAN, art. 21.
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guarantee of the rights to freedom of assembly, association and
expression and other rights under the Constitution of Japan .... .1
Article 4(a) and (b) of the CERD, as explained above, imposes explicit
obligations on state parties to implement laws that prohibit and punish both
expression that promotes and incites racial discrimination, as well as
organizations and propaganda activities that promote or incite racial
discrimination. So, the key question is whether such laws would be
compatible with the rights to freedom of expression and association in
Article 21 of the Constitution of Japan. And, as discussed in the
Introduction, this is not only a question for Japan-finding the right balance
between respecting and enforcing the rights to freedom of expression and
association on the one hand, while on the other hand protecting the right to
be treated equally under the law and not to be discriminated against, is the
challenge facing many constitutional democracies in trying to craft laws that
govern hate speech. In order to address this question in the context of Japan,
however, it is necessary to provide some explanation of the right to freedom
of expression in Japan.
First, freedom of expression arguments against hate speech laws in
Japan, particularly those made by politicians from the governing LDP, are
difficult to take entirely at face value. More precisely, it is difficult to
interpret such arguments as reflecting good faith concerns for the protection
of the constitutional right o freedom of expression. Rather, they are more
likely convenient pretexts to help justify the government's refusal to
implement more rigorous laws to defend the rights of minorities. Such
skepticism arises from the fact that, while in power, the LDP has shown scant
regard for the right to freedom of expression in its enactment of other laws.
Most recently, in the same period in which the hate speech law was being
debated, it passed laws and engaged in conduct that was widely condemned
for undermining the right to freedom of expression. The most significant
instance of this was the passage of a state secrets law, the Act on the
Protection of Specially Designated Secrets,72 which criminalized and
established severe prison sentences for the disclosure of a vastly expanded
71. CERD, supra note 5, reservationby Japan (Dec. 15, 1995).
72. i 'T-)25 12A 3 H $f 108, [The Law Relating
to the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, Law No. 108, 2013] http://law.e-
gov.gojp/htmldataIH25IH25HO108.htm [hereinafter Special Secrets Law] (English translation at
http://wwwjapaneselawtranslation.go jp/law/detail/?id=2543&vm=04&re=01).
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range of information vaguely defined as "national secrets."7 3 The law was
severely criticized within Japan, not only by various organizations of
journalists, but by the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations and other
advocacy and human rights groups. There was also criticism from outside
Japan. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, in its Concluding Observations
on the periodic report of Japan under the ICCPR, singled out the Specially
Designated Secrets Law as likely violating the rights to freedom of
expression and freedom of the press provided for in Article 19 of the ICCPR.
It noted that, in particular, the law contained vague and overly broad
designations of the kind of information that would be subject to the law,
coupled with severe criminal sanctions, which together would combine to
create a significant chilling effect on the activities of journalists and human
rights advocates.
While the enactment of the Specially Designated Secrets Law stands
out as the most obvious example, the government has engaged in many other
activities over the last five years that have been criticized for interfering with
and suppressing both freedom of the press and freedom of expression-
frequently to influence reporting on such issues as the government efforts to
reinterpret Article Nine of the Constitution, and the official failures
regarding the Fukushima nuclear disaster.7 6 Concerns have been expressed
in many quarters that press freedom in Japan has declined in the last five
years as a result of these developments.
73. For analysis of the law, see, e.g., Lawrence Repeta, A New State Secrecy Law for Japan?,
11 ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN Focus, Oct. 18, 2013, http://apjjf org/2013/11/42/Lawrence-Repeta/40
11/article.html; Lawrence Repeta, Japan's 2013 State Secrecy Act-the Abe Administration's
Threat to News Reporting, 12 ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN FOCUS, Mar. 3, 2014, http://apjjf org/2014/
12/10/Lawrence-Repeta/4086/article.html.
74. See Repeta, Japan's 2013 State Secrecy Act, supra note 73, for a compilation of sources,
but for the JFBA analysis see, e.g., JFBA, Statement Opposing the Special Secrets Bill and Calling
for a Full-Scale Review on the System for a Protection of Secrecy Law in Accordance with the
Tshwane Principles, Nov. 15, 2013, http://www.nichibenren.or jp/en/document/statements/year/
2013/131115.htil.
75. HRC Report, 2014, supra note 48, at para. 23.
76. See, e.g., Anchors Away: Media Freedom in Japan, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2016,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21693269-criticism-government-being-airbrushed-out-
news-shows-anchors-away; Is Japan's Public Broadcaster Under Threat, BBC NEWS, Mar. 20,
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26403639; News Giant in Japan Seen as Being
Compromised, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/world/asia/news-
giant-in-japan-seen-as-being-compromised.html.
77. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, Japanese Government Threatens to Tighten Grip
on Broadcasters, Feb. 25, 2016, http://www.ifj.org/nc/news-single-view/backpid/1/article/japan
ese-governnents-threatens-to-tighten-grip-on-broadcasters/; Reporters Without Borders, RSF
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What is more, it cannot be said that the government's reluctance to
enact a more restrictive and effective hate speech law was driven by some
well-founded concern that the law might be struck down by the courts. The
passage of the broad, restrictive, and highly punitive Specially Designated
Specially Designated Secrets Law alone stands against that proposition. But
more significantly, freedom of expression has never been rigorously
enforced by the courts. Indeed, in the seventy years since the Constitution
was promulgated, the Supreme Court has never struck down a law or found
a government policy or action unconstitutional by reason of violating Article
21 of the Constitution. And that is not because there have been no laws
challenged as violating Article 21, or that all laws in Japan have been
uniformly enacted so as to respect and comply with the rights in question.
In fact, there has been no shortage of cases challenging laws as violating
freedom of expression and association. In many of those cases, the laws in
question-laws enacted by LDP governments-were highly suspect in terms
of their limits on freedom of speech. As Shinegori Matsui (among many
others) has argued, the Supreme Court has simply adopted an overly
deferential posture, and employed an excessively relaxed standard of review
for justifying laws that infringe the right to freedom of expression.71 In most
of the seminal cases involving freedom of speech, the Court has simply
applied what Americans would call a "rational-basis" standard of review-
finding that the limitation of the right is justified so long as the court can
establish that the law was enacted to achieve a legitimate objective (normally
cast in terms of the "public welfare"), and that there is a rational connection
or reasonable relationship between that objective and the means adopted to
achieve it. 79 Even when the Court has purported to employ a slightly higher
standard of review, engaging in some form of "balancing of interests," it has
done so in a manner highly deferential to the government interest, and has
invariably upheld the challenged law.so
In reviewing the seminal cases in which the Supreme Court and lower
courts have dismissed constitutional freedom of expression claims, Matsui
Concerned About Declining Media Freedom in Japan, Apr. 11, 2016, https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-
concerned-about-declining-media-freedom-japan; I ternational Federation of Journalists (IFJ).
78. Shigenori Matsui, Freedom of Expression in Japan, 38 OSAKA UNIV. L. REV. 13 (1991)
[hereinafter Matsui, Freedom of Expression]; see also P OEJO lik (2014).
[MOTOHIRO HASHIMOTO, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THEORY AND INTERPRETATION (2014)].
79. Matsui, Freedom of Expression, supra note 78, at 21; see also P $ , $U
RP) (2005) [NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, READING CONSTITUTIONAL CASES (2005)], at 184-207.
80. Matsui, Freedom of Expression, supra note 78, at 16-18, citing the Hakata Station TV
Film case, Supreme Court of Japan, 23 Keishii 11 (1969), 1490, and the Sarufutsu case, Supreme
Court of Japan, Grand Bench, 28 Keishit 9 (1974), 393.
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also examined the range of statutes that severely limit both freedom of
expression and freedom of association and assembly in Japan, in the form of
both content-based regulation and content-neutral controls."' The substance
of some of these, such as the Public Offices Election Act, which prohibits the
distribution of pamphlets during election campaigns,8 2 and the manner in
which other laws and public ordinances have been applied,83 Seriously limit
political speech and political assembly-activity that is considered to be at
the very core of the right to freedom of expression.4 The upshot of all of
this is that the government of Japan is not at all reluctant to enact laws that
limit the freedom of expression; nor does it have much reason to fear the
prospect of such laws being struck down as unconstitutional by the courts.
Consistent with this critique, many scholars and commentators in Japan
worry that the passage of hate speech laws, or any legislation that might limit
freedom of speech, will provide a cynical government with more leverage to
further muzzle dissent and debate within Japan.5 Such concerns are not
trivial or entirely misplaced. Even as the legislation was being debated,
members of the ruling LDP suggested that the new law could be used against
members of organizations resisting the construction of a new American
naval base in Okinawa-which, quite obviously, would have been entirely
inconsistent with its purported purpose.86
All of this having been said, regardless of the possible insincerity of the
government's free speech objections, and the judiciary's past failure to
protect the right to freedom of expression, lawmakers and scholars should
nonetheless be striving to develop hate speech laws that do respect and
comply with the constitutional right o freedom of expression. Their concern
for whether a proposed hate speech law violates the constitutional right is
81. Matsui, Freedom ofExpression, supra note 78, at 22-23, 29-30, 33-36.
82. Id. at 23-24. For discussion of why such a facially content-neutral limitation on door-to-
door political canvassing should, from the American perspective, have profound content-
differential effects and may thus be deemed invalid, see CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 171 (1995).
83. Matsui, Freedom ofExpression, supra note 78, at 34-35.
84. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970);
ARCHIBALD Cox, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1981); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Thomas Scanlon,A Theory ofFreedom
of Expression, in R. M. DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1977); for more discussion of the
rationales underlying theories of freedom of expression, see infra note 91.
85. See, e.g., Kotani, supra note 21.
86. Eric Johnston, LDP Lawmaker Suggests Using Hate Speech Bill on Protesters in




STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE
thus entirely valid and legitimate. But in my view, they should be seeking
to find the right balance between respect for f eedom of expression on the
one hand, and the right to equality and not to be discriminated against on the
other hand, in fashioning a hate speech law that is both effective and also
consistent with the Constitution. In thinking about how to do that, it is often
helpful to consider how other countries have grappled with the challenge-
for it is certainly not a challenge unique to Japan. Unfortunately, however,
Japanese lawmakers, jurists, and scholars, most frequently look to the United
States for insights on how to approach issues relating to constitutional rights
issues.Y' It may also seem quite natural in this instance, given the very robust
protection of freedom of expression in the jurisprudence of the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. But in the context of
hate speech, those robust protections have come at the xpense of the rights
of minorities. As I have argued elsewhere in more detail, when it comes to
considering comparative examples of doctrine and jurisprudence relating to
the protection of equality rights, constitutional systems uch as that of Canada
provide the Japanese with a more fruitful comparison than the United States."
And on hate speech too, the United States does not provide a good example.
II. The American Approach
The American approach to freedom of expression is quite well known
in Japan. It has been invoked both by Japanese scholars arguing more
generally for more rigorous protection and enforcement of free speech rights
by Japanese courts, and it has been deployed more recently by those resisting
the pressure for stricter hate speech laws. But for reasons that I will develop
below, I would suggest hat while the American example may be helpful for
bolstering demands for more robust protections of freedom of expression
more generally, it is not the best example for dealing with hate speech, or
even for developing particular doctrinal approaches to freedom of expression
under the Japanese Constitution. The American system has not recognize a
balance between the rights to freedom of speech and the right to equal
protection in resolving the hate speech issues, but rather privileges speech
over equality in a way that should not be emulated. The Canadian example,
I will argue, strikes a more balanced approach. What is more, the Canadian
and Japanese systems share some similarities, such as a greater sensitivity to
the relevant international law obligations, and even the text of the respective
87. See, e.g., Matsui, Freedom of Expression, and Hashimoto, supra note 78, and Ichkawa
and HIGAKI, supra note 34; and more generally see e.g., PERE, WA II: AfMi
(1994) [ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOL. II: THEORY OF RIGHTS (1994)].
88. Martin, Glimmers ofHope, supra note 10.
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constitutional provisions. Together, these should make the Canadian
example an important consideration for Japanese law and policy makers,
jurists, and scholars alike.
A. Overview-The Pigeonhole Approach
It may be apposite to begin by recalling the basic landscape of the
American approach to freedom of speech. The First Amendment provides
for a very broad and apparently unqualified right: "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people to peacefully assemble . . ."8 The Supreme Court has developed a
rather complex web of doctrine so as to permit some limits on expression.
However, it remains the case that the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech is the most powerful of rights among the American individual
constitutional rights, and the U.S. courts tend to privilege freedom of speech
over other rights that may come into tension with free speech.
Analysis in U.S. freedom of speech cases typically revolve around two
questions: First, what is the nature of the law or regulation that is alleged to
be limiting speech; and second, what is the nature of the speech that the law
is attempting to limit. With respect to the first question, the issue is whether
the law aims to limit the content of speech. Laws or policies that purport to
limit speech on the basis of its content, or worse still its viewpoint, are
viewed with the greatest suspicion, and will be held to the strictest scrutiny,
or the highest standards of review, for purposes of justification. But this is
only so for speech that is fully protected. For in response to the second
doctrinal question, regarding the nature of the speech that is subject to
limitation, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of categories of
speech that have been deemed to be unprotected, or to be lesser protected,
by the First Amendment. Thus, if the speech that is limited by the impugned
law is determined to fall within one of these categories, even if the law is
designed to limit the content of the speech,90 the law will be subjected to a
less strict level of scrutiny-either because such speech is said not to come
within the scope of the right of freedom of speech at all, is of "lower value"
in terms of the underlying rationales for protecting freedom of speech,91 or
89. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
90. This phrase requires some qualification, as will be discussed in the analysis of the case
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), see infra Part II-C.
91. The three rationales most frequently articulated are that freedom of expression is essential
to: further the democratic process; facilitate the search for truth in a "marketplace of ideas"; and
allow for the realization of personal actualization. A fourth that is sometimes included, is
"promoting tolerance." See, e.g. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
[Vol. 45:3482
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because it has been long established that the limitation on such speech can
be justified under strict scrutiny and so courts need not go through the
process every time the category of speech is implicated.9 2
Among the unprotected and lesser protected categories of speech are
defamation, obscene expression, a d child pornography. The most germane
to our analysis, however, are "fighting words," "incitement to violence or
crime," and "true threats." These are the most relevant to our analysis
precisely because no distinct category for "hate speech" has yet been
developed by the courts. As a result, legislators seeking to craft (and later
defend) laws aimed at constraining hate speech, must do so in a manner that
characterizes the speech to be limited in such a way that it can fit within one
of the established categories of lesser-protected speech. In other words, if the
courts are not satisfied that the speech that is being limited by the challenged
law fits into one of the categories for unprotected or lesser-protected speech,
then the challenged law will be subject to strict scrutiny as a content-based
regulation93-that is, the government will have to prove that the law serves
some compelling state interest, and that the means chosen to achieve that
objective is necessary, or at minimum carefully tailored and the least restrictive
alternative.94 It is far less likely to survive a stnict scrutiny standard of review.
What is more, as I will discuss below, once there is a finding of content-based
limitation, the Court tends to presume it to be fatal and seldom embarks on a
rigorous application of the strict scrutiny justification analysis. Most of the
work is done on the question of categorization. One of the criticisms of the
POLICIES 973-74 (2015) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES]. Yet another
rationale that is sometimes distinguished from the argument for democratic process, is a justification
from social contract theory-which can be distinguished on the grounds that this rationale would not
accept suppression of speech that argues for the overthrow of the democratic system itself. See
Michael Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24
CARDOZO L. REv. 1523 (2003), citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971), and more
generally, FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
92. There are differences of view as to whether, for instance, defamation is "unprotected" as
being outside the scope of the right, or whether the justification for its limitation is simply so well
entrenched that i need not be repeated. The fact that the Supreme Court narrowed the exception
for defamation in the relatively recent case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
would suggest hat it is the latter, as does the reasoning of the majority inR.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992), but debate remains. There is, obviously, a massive scholarly literature on the
First Amendment and freedom of speech.
93. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994).
94. See, e.g., Brownv. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (holding that a
law limiting violent video games was content based, and thus "invalid unless California can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government
interest and is narrowly drawnto serve that interest"); and see Bursonv. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)
(upholding a content based limitation on speech as nonetheless satisfying strict scrutiny).
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American approach is that the Supreme Court has at once continued to adhere
to this rather rigid and somewhat clumsy framework of pigeonhole categories,
but at the same time been exceedingly reluctant to create new categories to
address such armful forms of expression as hate speech.95
B. The Early Cases: Group Libel, Incitement, Fighting Words
The Supreme Court of the United States came closest to recognizing
some form of lesser protected category for hate speech in the 1952 case of
Beauharnais v. Illinois.96 An accused man challenged the constitutionality
of an Illinois criminal law provision that made it unlawful to create or
disseminate racist material which "exposes the citizens of any race, color,
creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy . . . ."97 He was charged
for having circulated a petition calling upon the City Council of Chicago to
halt the invasion of white neighborhoods by "the Negro," and arguing that
the white race must be united by the "need to prevent the white race from
being mongrelized by the negro . .. [and] the aggressions, rapes, robberies,
knives, guns and marijuana of the negro."98 The Court upheld that statute,
condemning racism and providing a powerful argument for the importance
of laws such as the one in question. But, it upheld the law by suggesting that
racist expression was analogous to, and indeed a species of, criminal libel,
thus fitting the speech into the well-established category of defamation as an
unprotected or lesser protected form of speech.99 So even in this high-water
mark case for upholding a form of hate speech law, the Court tried to
somewhat awkwardly shoehorn the law into an existing pigeonhole, rather
than create a new category of less protected speech. And because it chose
libel as the most convenient category, the judgment was short lived. For
while Beauharnais has never been explicitly overturned, it is widely viewed
as being no longer good law. oo This is in part because its assumptions about
the scope of the category of less protected defamatory speech were radically
modified in later cases (specifically New York Times Co. v. Sullivan).'0'
Courts have thus had to cast about for other pigeonholes. Subsequent
95. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech: Address of the Honorable John
Paul Stevens, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300-12 (1993).
96. Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
97. Id. at 251.
98. Id. at 252.
99. Id. at 254-56.
100. Colin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1978); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1365 (3rd ed. 2009) [hereinafter, CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW];
Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 1536.
101. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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decisions have characterized laws limiting racist expression and other hate
speech as limitations on speech that falls within such lesser-protected
categories as fighting words and incitement. But as we will see, the concerns
regarding such lesser-protected speech-the concerns which gave rise to the
categories in the first place-are quite different from those that animate
governments to limit hate speech. And legislative efforts to limit hate speech
do not typically satisfy the criteria for such categories.
The courts have exempted the "fighting words" and the "incitement to
criminal or violent activity" categories from full First Amendment protection
primarily for reasons of public order. More specifically, the concern is that
the speech will provoke or elicit a response that will be violent or criminal.
To begin with "incitement," the primary concern underlying the exception is
with imminent harm, either through the commission of illegal acts or by
violence, which is likely to be directly incited by the speech. In the early
development of this category, the doctrine required the government to
establish that the speech prohibited by the law constituted a "clear and
present danger" of bringing about some illegality that the government had a
right to prevent.102 The doctrine evolved over the following decades and
crystallized in its current form in the so-called Brandenburg test. The case,
Brandenburg v. Ohio,10 3 involved the prosecution of a leader of a Ku Klux
Klan group for advocating violent action against the state, when he
threatened such action if the federal government continued to "suppress the
white race." While he and other members of the Klan had been recorded on
film making virulently hateful statements about African Americans and
Jews, that was not the primary legal grounds for the prosecution. Rather, he
was prosecuted under Ohio's "syndicalism" statute, one of many similar
state laws that made it an offense to advocate certain forms of violence,
sabotage, or terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or to effect political reform104-a reflection of the anticommunist
paranoia in the immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution. The
Supreme Court overturned earlier cases that had upheld such laws,to holding
that the mere advocacy of violence or illegality could not be prohibited,
"except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."106 The focus,
therefore, was entirely on the activity that the expression will provoke, and
102. Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
103. Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
104. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
105. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
106. Id.
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it is only where such reaction will likely be immediate, and violent or
unlawful, that the speech may be limited. The Brandenburg test that was
thereby established carved out this narrow category of speech that is less
protected under the First Amendment: Namely expression that constitutes
incitement to imminent lawless or violent action.
What becomes clear, therefore, is that Brandenburg was itself not really
about hate speech as a matter of law, even though the accused had certainly
engaged in the propagation of hate speech. And equally clear is that efforts
to justify hate speech laws on the grounds that they regulate a particular form
of "incitement" will likely not satisfy the Brandenburg test, ince the primary
purpose of hate speech laws is not to prevent a possible violent reaction to
the hateful speech. Rather, there are two primary objectives that hate speech
laws arguably seek to achieve: first, is to prevent the various kinds of harm
that such speech causes to members of the minority group, on an individual
and collective basis; and second, is to prevent the injury that the hate speech
does to the values of tolerance and equality within the society at large, by
fostering hatred and discrimination.0 7 Some narrow band of hate speech
might indeed incite a violent reaction, but that is not the primary concern,
and the category of speech is not defined by whether the reaction will be
violent or unlawful.
The doctrine relating to the less-protected category of "fighting words"
does not fare much better as a basis for justifying hate speech laws. Again,
the emphasis is almost entirely on whether the offending expression is likely
to provoke a retaliation or violent response.os The case that established the
category, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, actually included a second element,
that of expression amounting to the kind of insult that would likely cause
harm to the listener. But that element has not been upheld since, and indeed
the entire category has been significantly narrowed in subsequent cases.109
It is only language likely to provoke an immediate violent response that now
comes within the category." 0 But even so, laws purporting to limit fighting
words are typically struck down for being excessively vague and overly
broad in any event."'
A plan by neo-Nazis to march in uniform through a prominently Jewish
suburb of Chicago, called the Village of Skokie, gave rise to a series of cases
in the late 1970s that are often viewed as exemplifying the thorny
107. For more on the nature of such harm, see the sources in notes 38, and text associated with
infra notes 174-181.
108. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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constitutional issues surrounding efforts to limit hate speech. In response to
the announced plan by the National Socialist Party of America ("NSPA") to
conduct this deliberately provocative march, Skokie enacted a number of
ordinances. One of these prohibited "the dissemination of any materials with
the Village of Skokie which promotes and incites hatred against persons by
reason of their race, national origin, and is intended to so." A second
ordinance prohibited public demonstrations by members of political parties
while wearing "military-style" uniforms.112 The ordinances also required the
application for permission, and the acquisition of insurance. The NSPA
challenged these ordinances and there were a series of cases in both State
and Federal courts. The most important decision in the line of cases, Colin
v. Jones, was handed down by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
held the ordinances to be in violation of the First Amendment freedom of
speech clause.113 The court first found that the key ordinance, the prohibition
on the dissemination of hateful materials, could not be characterized as either
constituting a limitation on "fighting words" within the meaning of
Chaplinsky, or incitement to violence or unlawful acts, within the meaning
of Brandenburg."4 The Village had, indeed, conceded that the ordinance
had not been enacted out of concerns over a violent response to the march.
Instead, the primary argument of the Village of Skokie was that the
ordinance was a limitation on hate speech, which could be justified pursuant
to the holding in Beauharnais v. Illinois. The court, however, rejected this
central argument for two reasons. First, because the court read even
Beaharnais as being primarily grounded in a concern that the limited group
libel could "cause violence and disorder." That, it pointed out, was indeed
the primary justification for the criminal libel laws that the court had invoked
in Beauharnais."5 And, again, concern over violent reaction to the march
was not at issue in the case at hand. Second, and more importantly, the Court
expressed the strong view that Beauharnais was no longer good law in any
event, given how the scope of both civil and criminal libel law had been
narrowed by the Supreme Court in the intervening years.116 So to the extent
that Beauharnais might once have been viewed as a possible foundation for
112. Colinv. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1978).
113. Id. at 1199-1200. The Supreme Court declined to review the decision (Blackmun, J. and
White, J. dissenting on the grounds that any conflict between the 7th Circuit decision and the
judgment in Beauhranais v. Illinois should be resolved by the Supreme Court, since Beauhranais
had neverbeen overturned); cert. denied, Smithy. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978).
114. Colinv. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978).
115. Collin, 578 F.2dat 1204.
116. Id. at 1205.
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justifying hate speech regulation, that hope was put to rest in the Skokie
litigation. A final argument made by the Village of Skokie was that the
ordinance was aimed at saving residents, many of whom were Holocaust
survivors, from the severe emotional distress likely to be caused by the march
(emotional distress being a new cause of action made permissible by recent
developments in tort law). The Court easily dispatched with that argument,
noting that principles grounding civil liability for the intentional infliction of
severe mental distress could not possibly justify a criminal statute of general
application to expression otherwise protected by the First Amendment."7 To
top it all off, the Court found the ordinance vague and overly broad, in the best
tradition of efforts to regulate fighting words or incitement."8
C. The Recent Cases: Viewpoint Limitation and True Threats
Two more recent Supreme Court decisions further exemplify the
difficulties with trying to limit hate speech. They do so in part by reflecting
the extent to which legislators have tried to craft laws to fit within the
established categories of lesser-protected speech; and in part by reinforcing
how reluctant the Court is to accept any viewpoint-based limitation on
speech, regardless how hateful or harmful such speech may be. The first of
these cases ostensibly involved "fighting words." In R.A. V v. City of St.
Paul,"9 the issue was a municipal ordinance that prohibited the use of
symbols or objects, such as a burning cross or Nazi swastika, "which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." 2 0 It can be
inferred that the essential purpose of this law was to limit a species of hate
speech, but it was framed in a manner designed to satisfy the "fighting
words" test. The law was used to prosecute two young men who had erected
a burning cross in the yard of the house of an African-American family. The
intent and meaning of the action was unambiguous-the symbolic power of
a burning cross in the United States is difficult to overstate. It is a symbol
associated with the Ku Klux Klan and its campaign of terror against African
Americans in particular, and minorities in general. As the Court stated in a
subsequent case, "whether the message is a political one or whether it is also
meant to intimidate, the burning of a cross is a 'symbol of hate.'""21
117. Collin at 1206.
118. Id. at 1207.
119. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
120. Id.
121. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003).
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The City of St. Paul had tried to narrow the scope of its prohibition on
fighting words (which, as mentioned earlier, are frequently struck down for
being vague and overbroad) to only those symbols that had salience due to
their relationship with personal characteristics of race, color, creed, religion,
and gender. But this effort to narrow the scope of the law was precisely what
the Court held that it could not do. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
found that because the ordinance distinguished between different kinds of
fighting words based on content, suppressing hateful expression against
certain groups but not others (such as political groups, union members or
homosexuals), it was not only a content-based regulation of speech, but was
indeed a viewpoint-based limitation constituting "special prohibitions on
those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."l 22 Though
fighting words constituted a category of less-protected speech, that did not
mean that the category was entirely outside of the scope of the First
Amendment right, and thus the government was not entitled to discriminate
in its limitation of fighting words.123
It is somewhat striking that Justice Scalia was far more concerned about
the discrimination against certain forms of hateful speech, than he appeared
to be about the discriminatory impact and harm caused to minorities by such
hateful speech. Indeed, he scarcely addressed the issue of the harmful
consequences of such speech at all. This may be in part because the entire
issue had been framed as one of "fighting words." Thus, the concern was
over the "reaction" that such words would provoke, rather than on hate
speech per se, and the nature and extent of the harm it would cause to the
minorities it targeted. St. Paul had tried to get beyond the pure fighting
words argument with a claim that even if the ordinance was a content-based
regulation, it was nonetheless permissible as a regulation aimed at limiting
"secondary effects," pursuant to the Court's decision in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.12 4 But Justice Scalia swatted that argument aside,
noting that "listener's reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary
effects' we referred to in Renton . . . the emotive impact of speech on its
audience is not a 'secondary effect.'"
2 5
The justification analysis in the judgment included some passing
reference to the harm that might be caused by the kind of hateful expression
122. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 391.
123. Id. at 388.
124. City of Rentonv. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
125. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 395 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) and City ofRenton,
475 U.S. 41) (internal citation and quotation marks excluded).
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that St. Paul was trying to constrain, but it was perfunctory at best.12 6 Having
determined that the ordinance was a viewpoint-based limitation within the
category of fighting words, Justice Scalia indicated that it must therefore be
subject to strict scrutiny.127  Yet that analysis was neither searching nor
rigorous, which is part of a pattern in these types of cases. Justice Scalia
accepted the City of St. Paul's argument that the purpose of the law was a
compelling state interest-namely "to ensure the basic human rights of
members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination,
including the right of such group members to live in peace where they
wish." 28 But, in insisting that the law be necessary to achieve that objective,
he asserted that "the existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives" was
fatal to the justification.129 Yet he provided no explanation of what those
other alternatives might have been, nor indicated what evidence had been
adduced to support the assertions, other than to suggest that a completely
undifferentiated prohibition on fighting words would have sufficed.130 That
dubious proposition, of course, is undermined by the fact that fighting words
legislation frequently runs afoul of vagueness and over-breadth principles.131
As I will return to discuss in more detail below, it also does not take seriously
the idea that the kind of hate speech that targets certain identifiable groups is
particularly pernicious, and that the state thus has a particular interest-an
interest informed by constitutional values enshrined in the equal protection
clause-in limiting such hate speech. The City of St. Paul clearly understood
this idea, as was reflected in choices made in drafting the legislation, but the
pigeonhole categories of constitutional doctrine also forced the City to couch
the prohibition in the language of "fighting words," and the Court in turn
dealt with the law entirely in terms of such "fighting words."
The second more recent case that is viewed as being part of the hate
speech canon, Virginia v. Black,132 also involved yet another instance of
cross burning. The Court in this case considered and purported to apply the
holding in R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul. It is typically considered a "hate speech"
and "fighting words" case, and it is read by some as possibly creating some
space for hate speech laws. This is because, while the majority stuck down
126. For a detailed analysis of how the courts in the American hate speech cases have tended
to discount and even trivialize the harm, see Moran, supra note 38.




131. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 100, at 1347-49.
132. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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parts of the challenged law for other reasons, it held that a state could indeed
prohibit the burning of crosses for the purposes of intimidation.133 But while
I applaud such attempts to use the judgment to open up such a space, in my
view, the decision does not establish the basis for permitting the kind of hate
speech laws that I am discussing here. It does not come close to creating a
new lesser-protected category of hate speech, and indeed it viewed the law
as coming within yet a different narrow and long-established pigeonhole.
This becomes clear with a closer examination of the Court's reasons.
At issue was a Virginia law that made it a criminal offence to burn a
cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, on the
property of another person or in a public place. The law further provided
that the burning of the cross was itself prima facie evidence of the intent to
intimidate. The case involved the amalgamation of three separate
prosecutions-one against a Ku Klux Klan leader for burning a cross at a
Klan rally, and the other two against a group of three individuals who had
burned a cross in the yard of a black neighbor. The law had been challenged
in all three cases as violating the First Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor reviewed the history of the
Ku Klux Klan and the symbolism of cross burning in America and found (as
quoted earlier) that the burning of a cross is always a symbol of hate. But
the issue was not whether it was an expression of hatred, but whether it was
used with an "intent to intimidate." The term was construed very narrowly,
as meaning a motivation "to intentionally put a person or a group of persons
in fear of bodily harm."l34 While the Klan's history of burning of a cross
was often intended to make people fear for their life, the Court held that it
was clearly not always used for that purpose. It may always be a symbol of
hate, but it may not always be meant to make specific people fear imminent
violence. Justice O'Connor went on to write "sometimes the cross burning
is a statement of ideology, a symbol of solidarity. It is a ritual used at Klan
gatherings, and its used to represent the Klan itself." 35 Hateful, yes, and
while she never addressed it, it is even likely to always cause fear, a sense of
oppression and denigration on the part of black Americans, but not always
intimidation in terms of intending to cause fear of imminent bodily harm.
In this sense, while most of the separate opinions in Virginia v. Black
discuss R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul at length, it should not be misunderstood as
133. Indeed, Rory Little, in his article for this symposium, makes this argument. See Rory
Little, Hating Hate Speech: Why Current FirstAmendment Doctrine Does Not Condemn a Careful
Ban, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577 (2018).
134. Virginiav. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 349 (2003).
135. Id. at 366.
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being a case about "fighting words." Leaving aside the factual similarity of
burning crosses, the Court considered R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul for purposes
of assessing whether the Virginia law was a viewpoint-based limitation
within a lesser-protected category of speech. However, the lesser-protected
category of speech is that of "true threats," not "fighting words."'36 Justice
O'Connor explained that true threats constitute a "serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group," whether or not the speaker actually intends to carry out the threat;
and the prohibition "is aimed at protecting 'individuals from the fear of
violence and from the disruption that fear engenders.'"37 The prohibition
on the burning of crosses with intent to intimidate, therefore, was a
prohibition on a form of true threat, not a prohibition of fighting words, and
not a constraint on hate speech per se.
The Court held that the prohibition on cross burning, while a content-
based limitation within the proscribable category of "true threats," differed
from the viewpoint-based limits in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, because it was
not limited to prohibiting an intent to intimidate any particular group, as
defined by race, gender, or any other such personal characteristic.
Notwithstanding the very powerful history of the Ku Klux Klan using cross
burning to intimidate and terrorize African Americans, Justice O'Connor
held that "as a factual matter it is not true that cross burners direct their
intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities." 38 As dubious
as that claim might seem, in essence the argument was that Virginia could
prohibit a particularly virulent form of intimidation, without running afoul of
the viewpoint-based limitation problem that the City of St. Paul ordinance had.
And it is telling that Justice Scalia, who had written the majority opinion in
R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul, concurred with that part of the decision. 139
In the final result, however, the Court struck down the Virginia law. It
did so because of the clause of the provision that made cross burning prima
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate. In explaining why and how this
presumption rendered the provision unconstitutional, the Court revealed just
how narrow its holding was. The presumption meant, Justice O'Connor
136. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
137. Id. at 359-60 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)) (internal quotes
omitted).
138. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
139. Id. at 368 (The concurring opinion of Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, dissented
strongly on this point, denying that cross burning merely represented a form of intimidation that
could be divorced from its historical ideological message. They also held that the law would run
afoul of the R.A. V v. City of St. Paul prohibition on viewpoint-based limits within proscribable
categories of speech); id. at 383-84.
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argued, that the State could "arrest, prosecute and convict a person solely on
the fact of cross burning itself," which would "create an unacceptable risk of
the suppression of ideas."o40 This was so, she reasoned, because burning a
cross might not be for the purpose of "intimidation" but rather could be a
"statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity .... It is a ritual used
at Klan gatherings, and it is sued to represent the Klan itself."' 4'
Notwithstanding that the ideology is one of racist white supremacy, that the
Klan is considered the oldest domestic terrorist organization in America, and
that cross burning is closely associated with arson, beatings, and lynching,
this was core political speech protected by the First Amendment.
Even more troubling for those looking to the decision in Virginia v.
Black as a basis for justifying some narrow form of hate speech laws, the
concurring decision of the more "liberal" justices was even more restrictive.
Justice Souter, writing for himself, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Kennedy,
held that the prohibition on cross burning with an intent to intimidate was
itself an unconstitutional content-based limitation within a lesser-protected
category, in violation of the holding in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.142 While
the statute did not explicitly discriminate among different forms of "fighting
words" on the basis of race, creed, religion or gender, as the ordinance had
in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, Justice Souter argued that cross burning was
clearly an anti-black symbol, and thus it was clear that the law was in effect
singling out for prohibition one specific form of intimidation that was tied to
a particular ideology.143 The state's apparent "discrimination" against the
hateful and terrorist expression of the cross burner was, in essence,
understood to do greater violence to a constitutional right than the state
permitting people to employ the most hateful and terrifying symbol in
American history to denigrate, terrorize, and foster prejudice and
discrimination against a racial minority.
D. Closing Observations
In short, laws that have either been enacted or deployed for the purpose
of prohibiting expression that might be considered hate speech, have been
routinely struck down. In purely doctrinal terms, this was primarily because
the court has resisted any attempt to create a new category of lesser-protected
(or "proscribable") speech. Thus, legislators have either sought o craft hate
speech laws in such a way as to fall within an existing category, as in R.A. V
140. Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
141. Id. at 365-66.
142. Id. at 380-82.
143. Id. at 384.
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v. City ofSt. Paul (fighting words) and Virginia v. Black (true threats), or the
speech has been categorized as falling within an existing category by the
prosecutors and courts, as in Brandeburg v. Ohio (incitement). Efforts to
defend laws as a justified limitation on hate speech as such, have been
roundly rejected, as reflected in the Skokie line of cases.
What is more, we can make some observations about these categories
that are typically implicated in hate speech related cases. For the most part,
they are primarily concerned with the effect that the speech may have on the
narrow target audience, the persons about whom and towards whom the
speech is made. Thus, with "fighting words" the concern is that the speech
will provoke the subject and target of the speech into imminent violent
reaction. With "incitement," the concern is that the speech will incite the
subject to commit imminent violent or criminal acts; and with "true threats,"
the concern is that the speech will cause the subject o suffer fear of imminent
violence. Violence and imminence are key elements of all, and with the
exception of those true threats for which there is not intent to actually carry
through with the threat, the underlying concern is that the resulting conduct
will disturb public order. So there is, ultimately, both a concern about the
reaction of the direct subject and the target audience, and (with the exception
of true threats) a concern about the secondary effects on society more
broadly. As I will return to explain in more detail in Part IV, I would suggest
that a narrow category of lesser-protected expression f hate speech would
similarly share these characteristics of multi-faceted concern, including the
reaction of the target audience, harm to the subject of the speech, and the
harm to the broader society. What would be quite different is the absence of
violence and imminence as features of the dynamic involved, or as criteria
for coming within the category of lesser-protected speech.
There are a couple of features almost entirely missing from the
American doctrinal approach to hate speech. The first, is a sophisticated
understanding or appreciation for the harm that hate speech causes. I will
discuss this harm in more detail in both Part III and Part IV, but in summary,
the evidence suggests hat the harm is threefold. There is serious harm to the
individual members of the group who are the subject of the hate speech, in
of the form of injury to their sense of self-esteem, a sense of alienation from
the community, the fostering of fear and a sense of oppression, and even their
exclusion from the public discourse. There is also harm to the broader
society in the form of the hatred aroused in the broader society against
members of the subject group, and thus the increased likelihood of
discrimination and even persecution by the broader population against
members of the subject group. Finally, regarding the third aspect of harm,
one could argue that the tolerance of this kind of speech, leading to increased
hatred and discrimination, does violence to the values and principles that are
[Vol. 45:3494
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foundational to a constitutional democracy, and thus ultimately causes harm
to the constitutional system itself.44 But the American cases do not at all
discuss the harm of hate speech in this manner. Indeed, it should be noted
here that while the "subjects" of hate speech are typically the members of
the minority group being vilified, the broader population, the non-group
majority, is often the target audience. This is entirely lost in the discussion
of the issue in the American cases-the entire focus is on the "hurt feelings"
of the subjects of hate speech, as though they are the target audience, and the
only harm relates to their direct response or reaction to the speech. The effect
of the speech on the true target audience, and the broader society, tends to be
entirely ignored. The cases tend to trivialize and minimize the harm caused
to the victims of hate speech and overlook altogether the extent to which it
may stoke hatred in the wider population and thereby contribute to
discrimination or worse against the targeted minority groups. 145
The second feature of the American approach to the issue of hate
speech, is the remarkable absence of any discussion of a possible relationship
between hate speech laws and the constitutional right o equal protection in
the Fourteenth Amendment. As I indicated earlier, and will return to in more
detail below, the Canadian and international law approaches (among others)
view hate speech laws as fulfilling the constitutional right o equal protection
from discrimination, thus creating a tension between the two fundamental
rights of freedom of expression on the one hand, and on the other hand the
right to be treated equally, and not to be discriminated against on the basis
of shared personal characteristics tied to identity. As we will see, it is the
kinds of prohibited grounds of discrimination in the equality rights in the
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, and in the ICCPR and the CERD,
that can most logically inform the scope of hate speech laws.146 One could
have argued that the viewpoint-based limitations on "fighting words" in
R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul, which were based on "race, color, creed, religion,
or gender," were indeed informed by the suspect and quasi-suspect
classifications in equal protection jurisprudence.47 In other words, the
viewpoint-based limits were designed to protect persons from the kind of
144. For more on this, see supra notes 38 and infra notes 174-181 and accompanying text.
145. This point is made in some detail by Moran, supra note 38, at 1439-41, 1446-50, 1454-
55. See also Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 1558 ("the American approach tends to remain blind to
the considerable potential harm that hate speech can cause to the equality and dignity concerns of
its victims or the attitudes and beliefs of non-target audiences") and 1560.
146. This argument is developed further infra Part IV.
147. Sunstein makes a similar point about Beauharnais, and about hate speech more generally;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 173, 184-85.
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discrimination (albeit in the private sphere) that the equal protection clause
is supposed to protect against (in the public realm), and that the justification
for such limits could have been framed in equal protection terms. But that
was not only not raised in the case itself, but it is not typically part of the
scholarly discourse on the issue either.148 In essence, in both case law and
scholarship, there is little recognition that efforts to limit hate speech implicate
a tension between the right to freedom of speech, and the right to be treated
equally and not to be discriminated against in society, far less any attempt to
find ways to resolve such a tension. Rosenfeld has summed it up well:
In terms of its assumptions, the American approach either
underestimates the potential for harm of hate speech that is short of
incitement to violence, or it overestimates the potential for rational
deliberation as a means to neutralize calls to hate. In terms of impact,
given its long history of racial tensions, it is surprising that the United
States does not exhibit greater concern for the injuries to security,
dignity, autonomy and well being which officially tolerated hate
speech causes to its black minority. Likewise, America's hate speech
approach seems to unduly discount he pernicious impact that racist
speech may have on lingering dormant sentiments still harbored by a
non-negligible segment of the white population.149
As I will return to discuss in Part IV, if the courts and lawmakers
recognized a relationship between hate speech law and the values and
interests protected by the equal protection clause, then hate speech laws
would look quite different, and would indeed be more narrowly drawn; and
the approach to their justification would be different. I will argue below that
such laws could be upheld even under the current American doctrinal
approach.
III. The Canadian Approach
In contrast to the American experience, Canada has seen the nactment
of hate speech laws at both the federal and the provincial level, in both
criminal law and in human rights statutes, and they have largely survived
numerous constitutional challenges. In this section I will introduce the
statutory framework in some detail, given that I am suggesting that an
exception along the lines developed in Canada might serve as a good
example for other systems. I will then explain how the Supreme Court of
Canada has justified upholding these laws, and in particular how it has
148. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Regulation ofHate Speech and Pornography After R.A. V., 60 U.
CHI. L. REv. 873 (1993).
149. Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 1559-60.
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understood such hate speech laws as striking a balance between the right to
free expression and the right to equality.
A. The Statutory Framework
As indicated above, there is both a criminal law prohibition on the
dissemination of hate speech, as well as prohibitions in some (but not all)
provincial human rights codes. There was also a prohibition in the Federal
Canadian Human Rights Act,s0 but that was rescinded in 2013.'st The
criminal law prohibition is obviously the more serious limitation on free
speech. However, it is very narrowly drawn and provides for robust defenses,
so as to impinge on the right to freedom of expression to the minimum extent
possible, while still protecting the rights of identifiable groups typically
subject to discrimination and hatred. It is worth considering certain aspects
of the Criminal Code of Canada provision in detail. It provides that:
Public Incitement of Hatred
319 (1) ...
(2) Every one who, by communicating statements, other than in
pnivate conversation, wilfully promotes hatred against any identifiable
group is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Defences
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (2)
(a) if he establishes that the statements communicated were true;
(b) if, in good faith, the person expressed or attempted to establish by
an argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion based on
a belief in a religious text;
(c) if the statements were relevant to any subject of public interest, the
discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable
grounds he believed them to be true; or
(d) if, in good faith, he intended to point out, for the purpose of
removal, matters producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred
toward an identifiable group in Canada.
150. Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.
151. Section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act was repealed June 26, 2013.
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Definitions
(7) In this section,
communicating includes communicating by telephone, broadcasting
or other audible or visible means; (communiquer)
identifiable group has the same meaning as in section 318 [which
provides that identifiable group means any section of the public
distinguished by colour race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age,
sex. sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or mental or
physical disability] (groupe identifiable).152
public place includes any place to which the public have access as of
right or by invitation, express or implied; (endroit public)
statements includes words spoken or written or recorded
electronically or electro-magnetically or otherwise, and gestures, signs
or other visible representations. (declarations).153
The first subsection of Section 319, which I have omitted above,
prohibits the communication of statements that would incite such hatred as
is likely to lead to a "breach of the peace." This is similar to the kinds of
speech that would constitute "fighting words" or "incitement" in the
American jurisprudence. But Section 319(2) provides for the prohibition of
what is really at issue here-communication that is likely to incite hatred and
discrimination against identifiable groups, but which does not constitute either
incitement of imminent violence or criminal activity, nor is necessarily going
to provoke a reaction constituting a disruption of public order. The purpose is
more directly to prevent communication that will cause harm to members of
identifiable groups, typically minorities, by fostering prejudice, hatred, and
discrimination against hem. And as we will see, it prohibits speech that is
based on the same grounds of discrimination that are at the heart of the equality
right that individuals have in their relationship with government, enshrined in
Section 15 of the Charter ofRights and Freedoms.15 4
The provisions in the various provincial human rights codes tend to be
somewhat broader in reach, and do not contain the same level of defenses
and qualifications as the Criminal Code provision, for which reason they
have been the subject of considerable controversy and criticism, and judicial
review. It was partly in response to such criticism that the government under
Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper repealed the hate speech
152. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985 c. C-46, (last amended by S.C. 2017, c. 13), s. 318.
153. Id. at s. 319.
154. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Sched. B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, section 15(1) (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter of Rights and
Freedoms].
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provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act.15 5 The human rights codes
in the provinces of Canada, and at the federal level, provide a framework of
human rights, particularly equality rights, that individuals are to enjoy in
their private relations, such as in the context of employment, and access to
services. But in addition to the substantive rights, the legislation creates an
institutional apparatus for receiving individual complaints of rights
violations. They are assessed by the Human Rights Commission, and if
found credible, are advanced and advocated by the Commission before an
independent Human Rights Tribunal. However, the Tribunal is limited to
providing a civil remedy sounding in damages or declarations-and thus the
sanctions for violating the hate speech provisions in a human rights code are
significantly less serious than a violation of the Criminal Code provision.15 6
I will below discuss a recent and important Supreme Court decision
upholding the hate speech provisions of the Saskatchewan Human Rights
Code, and so I will leave detailed analysis of the language of such provisions
until then.17
B. Overview of Charter Rights at Issue
It is perhaps helpful to introduce the relevant constitutional landscape
under the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, before launching into
how particular hate speech laws are reviewed by the courts. The natural
place to begin is with freedom of expression. This is provided for in Section
2(b) of the Charter: "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b)
freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including freedom of
the press and other media communication."5 s The scope of the right to
freedom of expression has been interpreted in a broad and purposive manner,
as protecting any nonviolent activity that conveys or attempts to convey
meaning or expressive content.15 9  Moreover, in assessing whether the
challenged government action has limited or infringed this right, the inquiry
is again very broad, requiring the court to determine whether the purpose or
effect of the government action restricted the freedom.160
155. R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 (as amended).
156. For a succinct explanation of the Canadian Human Rights Act framework, see Julian
Walker, Canadian Anti-Hate Laws and Freedom of Expression, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT,
PUBLICATION NO. 2010-31-E, Mar. 27, 2013, https://lop.parl.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublic
ations/2010-3 1-e.pdf.
157. See infra Part III-C.
158. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 2(b).
159. Irwin Toy v. Quebec [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 969-70 (Can.).
160. Id.
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Quite unlike the American doctrinal approach of applying different
levels of scrutiny depending on the kind of regulation at issue, or the category
of speech that has been limited, the Supreme Court of Canada has developed
a single doctrinal framework for the justification stage of all Charter analysis.
This framework is indeed suggested by the language of Section 1 of the
Charter, which provides that the Charter "guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."l6 ' Upon finding
that a Charter right has been limited or infringed by government action,
therefore, the court moves to determine whether the limitation can be so
justified. The analytical framework employed is commonly referred to as
the Oakes test, after the case in which it was first elaborated.16 2
The Oakes test is quite typical of the proportionality analysis employed
in other constitutional systems, and is somewhat similar to the American
strict scrutiny test, but with an additional step that requires an explicit
analysis of the proportionality between the benefit to be achieved by the law
in relation to the harm caused by its violation of the right.16 3 In short, it
requires that the government first establish that the limitation is prescribed
by law; second, that it serves a pressing and substantial objective that is
consistent with the values of a free and democratic society; and third, that
there is proportionality between the means adopted and the objective to be
achieved by the legislation. This third element in turn requires that there is
a rational connection between the means and the end, that the means impairs
the right in question as little as possible, and that the benefit to be derived
from achieving the objective is proportionate to the harm caused by violating
the right.164 While there has been vigorous and ongoing debate within
Canadian constitutional circles over how and to what extent the Oakes test
has evolved over time, and how elastic it may be depending on the kind of
interests involved,16 5 it is reasonably constant when compared to the
American differentiated levels of scrutiny.
Finally, a few words of introduction are necessary for the equality rights
under the Charter, given that the Supreme Court has made explicit reference
161. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 1.
162. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
163. See DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2004) for a comparative study of
proportionality tests.
164. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
165. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, So What is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of
Proportionality Analysis Under the Canadian Charter's Section 1, 35 SUP. CT. REV. 501 (2006);
PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, Chap. 38 (5th ed. 2012).
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to these rights in its consideration of hate speech cases. Perhaps of particular
interest for Japanese readers, Section 15 of the Charter bears some
resemblance to the quality rights enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution
of Japan, in that it explicitly prohibits discrimination and provides a
nonexclusive list of grounds of discrimination that are considered prima
facie unjust.16 6 Specifically, it provides: "15(1) - Every individual is equal
before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability. "167
In contrast to the expansive reading of the right to freedom of
expression in Section 2(b), the scope of Section 15 has been interpreted to
be somewhat more limited, and does not leave all the work to be done in the
justification analysis.168  Section 15 obviously governs the relationship
between the individual and the state, and protects individuals from
discrimination at the hands of the state, and so one might wonder why it is
relevant at all to a discussion of laws prohibiting hate speech uttered by
private persons. But the courts have recognized that hate speech laws, which
serve the purpose of providing individuals with some protection from
discrimination within the private sphere, help to fulfill the guarantee of the
constitutional right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law. The
courts quite explicitly acknowledge that hate speech laws therefore trigger a
tension between two countervailing constitutional rights: freedom of speech
on the one hand, and the right to be treated equally and as an equal on the
other. The right to equality may be attenuated and indirect in this context, in
that hate speech laws are primarily aimed at preventing discrimination by
private entities, and thus do not directly implicate the equality rights of
Section 15. But, in contrast to the American and Japanese approaches, such
laws are nonetheless understood as being for the purpose of fulfilling the
equal protection of the law provided for in the Charter.169
166. See Martin, Glimmers ofHope, supra note 10, for my more detailed comparative analysis
of Canadian, American, and Japanese analytical pproaches to equality rights.
167. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15(1).
168. The seminal cases on the interpretation of Section 15 are Law Society of British Columbia
v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.) and Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.).
169. See infra Part IV-A for more detailed discussion of this point.
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C. Upholding the Criminal Prohibition
Section 319 of the Criminal Code has been challenged several times as
constituting a facial violation of the right to freedom of expression as
provided for in Section 2(b) of the Charter. In its first and seminal judgment
on the issue, in R. v. Keegstra,170 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the
constitutionality of the limits on freedom of expression created by Section
319. The case involved a high school teacher in Alberta who repeatedly
made virulently anti-Jewish statements to his pupils.' 7' He was prosecuted
under Section 319(2) of the Criminal Code,172 and he challenged the
constitutionality of the law. The Supreme Court's analysis in Keegstra
provides a framework for thinking about how such hate speech laws can be
justified, notwithstanding the limits they impose on freedom of expression,
and illustrates a marked departure from the approach taken by U.S. courts.
As indicated above, the initial inquiry in freedom of expression cases is
to determine whether the conduct that is said to have been limited constitutes
activity that conveys or attempts to convey meaning. On that analysis, the
expression of Keegstra clearly came within the scope of the protection
afforded by the right in Section 2(b). Similarly, the prohibition in Section
319(2) of the Criminal Code just as clearly impinged upon that right, in that
it had both the purpose and effect of limiting the kind of expression in which
Keegstra had been engaged.173 The question for the Court, therefore, was
whether the Criminal Code limitation could be justified in accordance with
Section 1 of the Charter. In applying the Oakes test in Keegstra, Chief
Justice Dickson, writing for the majority, took considerable time to examine
in detail the importance of the objective of Section 319(2). There was
extensive evidence provided to the court on the incidence of hate propaganda
in Canada, and the harmful effects such hate speech had on the individual
members of identifiable minority groups. In particular, the evidence
suggested that hate speech operated to foster a sense of rejection, alienation
and loss of place within the community, and to undermine the individual's
sense of self-worth and status in society.174
170. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
171. Id. at 713-14.
172. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (as amended), s.319(2).
173. It should be noted that the government tried to argue that hate speech, like violent action,
was outside of the scope of the right altogether, but this argument was rejected by the Court.
174. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 745; The Courtin particular cited the findings of The Special
Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada (the Cohen Committee), which were published in the
Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada, 1966, id. at 274-25, 745; A
report of the House of Commons Special Committee on Participation of Visible Minorities in
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The social science evidence also demonstrated that such hate speech
has a harmful impact on the society as a whole, in that it can skew attitudes
and beliefs, such that the hateful views may gain credence and help foster
discrimination and even violence against the target groups.175 Further, it can
have an even more fundamental or foundational harm to society, in that it
can undermine the very values of tolerance, equality, and respect for human
dignity that are essential to liberal democracy.176 Citing the experience of
Germany with the rise of the Nazi party and the increasing discrimination
against Jews in the 1930s, facilitated in large measure by Nazi-sponsored
hate propaganda, the Court expressed skepticism that society can always rely
on the unfettered and entirely unregulated marketplace of ideas to ensure that
the truth will emerge triumphant, at least in the short to medium term-and
in the interim, hate propaganda can cause significant harm, and emasculate
the principles that form the fundamental fabric of constitutional
democracy. 17 Quoting the report of The Special Committee on Hate
Propaganda in Canada, the Court held that:
We are less confident in the 20th century that the critical faculties of
individuals will be brought to bear on the speech and writing which is
directed at them . ... While holding that over the long run, the human
mind is repelled by blatant falsehood and seeks good, it is too often
true, in the short run, that emotion displaces reason and individuals
perversely reject the demonstrations of truth put before them and
forsake the good they know. The success of modem advertising, the
triumphs of impudent propaganda such as Hitler's, have qualified
sharply our belief in the rationality of man. We know that under strain
and pressure in times of irritation and frustration, the individual is
swayed and even swept away by hysterical, emotional appeals. We
act irresponsibly if we ignore the way in which emotion can drive
reason from the field. 7 8
The Court went on to note evidence that hate speech can have this effect in
often subtle and insidious ways, in that even when the message may be
Canadian Society, entitled Equality Now, id. at 745; ReportArising Out ofthe Activities ofthe Ku
Klux Klan in British Columbia, John D. McAlpine, 1981, id. at 749; The Canadian Bar
Association's Report of the Special Committee on Racial and Religious Hatred, 1984, id. at 749;
Law Reform Commission of Canada report, Hate Propaganda, 1986, id. at 749.
175. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 766.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 766-67; id. at 748-49.
178. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R at 747 (citing the Report of the Special Committee on Hate
Propaganda in Canada, 1966).
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consciously rejected by recipients, the underlying premises, of racial or
religious inferiority, can persist and affect attitudes and behavior.179
The Court also made the important point, one often missed in more
recent debates about the extent to which hate speech laws stifle free
expression, that hate speech can itself operate to limit the right to freedom of
expression and undermine the free marketplace of ideas. This is so because
hate speech, in the form of extreme forms of speech aimed at vilifying,
denigrating, and even dehumanizing members of minority groups within
society, not only distorts the search for truth, but suppress and silence the
voices of the members of the target minority.'s0 Members of the hated group
are effectively muzzled and driven from the public arena and fora of debate,
and so the marketplace of ideas is entirely deprived of their perspective.'8
Of considerable significance for those reflecting on possible models,
particularly for law and policy makers in Japan, the majority in Keegstra
explicitly reviewed both the American jurisprudence, as well as the
international law obligations of Canada. The majority conducted a detailed
review of the important American cases, and the scholarly treatment of that
jurisprudence, but concluded that the Charter required a different balance
among the competing rights.82 The Court went on later to explicitly examine
how other provisions of the Charter might inform the analysis of the
importance of the objective of Section 319(2). In sharp contrast to the
Amencan approach, the Court engaged in a very self-conscious balancing of
the different rights implicated by the conflict between freedom of expression
and hate speech laws. In particular, it considered how the hate-speech
provision furthered the right to equality and not to be discriminated against,
enshrined in Section 15 of the Charter. It went on to explain how the right
to equality was not merely a prohibition on discriminatory laws and other
state action, but rather imposed on government an obligation to take action
to protect people from discrimination in the private sphere.8 3 Therefore, the
Court reasoned that it was not limited to only considering equality rights in the
context the direct relationship between the state and the individual, but rather
it could also consider whether laws were designed to reduce private sector
discrimination in accordance with this obligation to realize the promise of
Section 15.184
179. Id.
180. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.CR at 762-63.
181. This point is similarly made by Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 1561-63.
182. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.CR at 738-744.
183. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 755 (citing Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrew,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 171 (Can.) (per McIntyre, J.)).
184. Id. at 751-54.
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The second move that the Court made that is significant in terms of
considering the Japanese situation, was to argue that the international law
obligations, imposed by the ICCPR and the CERD in particular, were
relevant to the justification of the hate speech law. It held that the human
rights obligations were not only relevant to interpreting the competing
Charter rights in question, but also to considering the importance of the
objectives of the hate speech laws in a free and democratic society. What is
more, the Court emphasized that the international law treaties themselves
contemplate a balance being struck between freedom of expression and the
right to equality in imposing an obligation to implement hate speech laws.s5
In applying the proportionality test that is required by Canadian
justification analysis in Charter cases, the Court noted that hate speech and
discriminatory propaganda tends to be quite far from the core principles that
provide the fundamental rationale for the right to freedom of expression. The
Supreme Court has accepted the three rationales that are most widely cited
as explaining the necessity for freedom of expression, namely: (i) for the
functioning of a democracy, and thus political speech in particular should be
protected; (ii) for the search for truth in a free exchange of ideas; and (iii) for
individual self-actualization and flourishing.18 6 The Court in Keegstra found
that the kind of narrowly defined hate speech prohibited by Section 319(2)-
which was deeply hurtful and damaging to the target group members,
misleading to listeners within society, and antithetical to tolerance,
understanding, and equality within society-was quite distant from these core
values.s7 Indeed, as indicated above, the Court argued that hate-speech can
hamper and undermine freedom of speech and interfere with the free
marketplace of ideas.'8s In sum, the Court concluded that while hate speech is
often "political" in some sense, thus placing it in a category that is viewed as
most protected by freedom of speech, the very narrowly defined expression in
question is in fact antithetical to the fundamental values of a democracy.89
Finally, it is important to note that the Court carefully examined the
definition of prohibited speech in Section 319(2), and particularly analyzed
the qualifications and defenses provided for in the provision to ensure that
only a very narrow category of expression, uttered willfully for a particular
purpose, is captured. We need not delve deeply into the details here, but the
185. Id..
186. Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 970-71 (Can.); see also supra note 91
(discussing these rationales).
187. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R at 761.
188. Id. at 762-63.
189. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R at 763.
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Court focused on several key elements of the law, which required that the
expression be public, that it was for the "wilfull" promotion of hatred, and that
it is limited to expression that "promotes" (not merely encourages or
expresses) hatred, and finally that it is limited to expression targeting aclearly
defined "identifiable group." All of this very much narrowed the category of
speech included in the prohibition. Moreover, the defenses provided were
robust, helping to ensure that only those who were willfully communicating
false statements designed to foster hatred could be prosecuted.'90
Such was the majority of the Court's justification in the seminal case
on the issue. Keegstra's conviction was upheld, though in the final analysis
it is interesting to note that he received a suspended sentence and a small
fine.191 The law and its application has been challenged many times since.
The Supreme Court has continued to uphold its constitutionality.
D. Justifying the Human Rights Code Provisions
As mentioned at the beginning of this Part, human rights legislation at
both the provincial and the federal level has included prohibitions on hate
speech that are broader in scope than Section 319 of the Criminal Code, and
the violation of which give rise to civil remedies. These provisions too have
been challenged as violating Section 2(b) of the Charter, and have been
similarly upheld by the Supreme Court. The two most important cases are
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor,192 a case from 1990 (the
same year as Keegstra), in which the Court considered a challenge to hate
speech provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act, and Whatcott v.
Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal,193 a much more recent case, in which
the Court upheld the hate speech provisions in the Saskatchewan Human
Rights Code.
At issue in Whatcott was the dissemination of pamphlets that vilified
homosexuals and advocated for their being barred from public schools.194
The provision at issue in the Saskatchewan legislation, Section 14(1)(b),
prohibited the publication, distribution or display of any representation "that
exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts
the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited
ground." 95 Prohibited grounds of discrimination are listed in the legislation,
190. Id. at 771-81.
191. Peter Bowal & Craig Graham, Whatever Happened to ... Jim Keegstra, LAWNOW
(July/Aug. 2012).
192. Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (Can.).
193. Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 (Can.).
194. Id. at para. 8.
195. SaskatchewanHumanRights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 (as amended), s. 14(1)(b) (Can.).
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and these reflect the same prohibited grounds of discrimination that are
provided for in Section 15 of the Charter ofRights and Freedoms, a point to
which I will return. But for now, it will be noted how much broader and
looser the scope of the language in the provision is, as compared to Section
319 of the Criminal Code. As might be expected, this language was
challenged in the case as being vague and overbroad, and as capturing
expression that was well outside the scope of true hate speech.
Justice Rothstein, writing for a unanimous Court, examined in some
detail the question of what precisely constitutes "hatred," as that term is used
in this and similar provisions. In doing so, he referred at length to the Court's
decision in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, in which
Dickson C.J.C had held that the term "hatred and contempt" had to be
interpreted narrowly, in a manner informed by Parliament's objective of
protecting the equality and dignity of all individuals.19 6 The term referred to
"unusually strong and deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and
vilification."l9 7 But Rothstein outlined all the objections that had been
mounted against this definition as established in Taylor, including arguments
that it was highly subjective, arbitrary, vague, and overbroad. Beginning
with the issue of subjectivity, he noted that the application of the provision
is based on a reasonable person standard. The determination of whether
some publication falls within the scope of the provision, does not depend on
the subjective views of the publisher or the victim of the hate speech, but
rather on an objective application of the test.198 The question posed is whether,
"when considered objectively by a reasonable person aware of the relevant
context and circumstances, the speech in question would be understood as
exposing or tending to expose members of the target group to hatred." 99
As for the word "hatred" itself, and whether it was inherently too
emotional to be susceptible to such an analysis, and would thus lead to both
subjective and arbitrary results, Justice Rothstein argued that courts are
entirely capable of adhering to both the proper meaning of the words
employed by the legislature, and applying them in a manner consistent with
the legislative objective.200 He further noted that it is important that courts
understand the depth and strength of the word "hatred"," which involves
detestation, vilification, and in the context of human rights legislation,
196. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467 at para. 24.
197. Id. (citing Taylor, 3 S.C.R. 892 at 928).
198. Id. atpara. 35.
199. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, para. 35.
200. Id. at para. 38.
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typically includes a component of viewing members of the target group as
being inferior. The act of vilification usually involves suggestions of vile
characteristics, inherent and immoral deficiencies, and is intended to
delegitimize members of the target group as unworthy of respect and inclusion
within the broader community.201 One of the more extreme forms of such
vilification, that is common to hate propaganda, is to dehumanize members of
the group, typically through the use of animal labels and metaphors.202
The depth and intensity of what is at issue is further informed by
considering the legislative objective. Here, the Court again rejected the idea
that hate speech law is concerned with mere "hurt feelings" or "humiliation"
on the part of the target group, or the expression of merely offensive and
repugnant ideas. "It does not, for example, prohibit expression which
debates the merits of reducing the rights of vulnerable groups in society. It
only restricts the use of expression exposing them to hatred as part of that
debate."203 Indeed, delving further into the legislative objective when
considering the importance of the "pressing and substantial objective" for
purposes of the Oakes test, the Court emphasized that the focus is not on the
nature of the ideas at all, but rather the discriminatory effects of the
expression, and how those effects constitute the harms discussed above in
Keegstra.204 It emphasized, again, that "[h]ate speech is, at its core, an effort
to marginalize individuals based on their membership in a group. Using
expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimize
group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their standing and
acceptance within society. When people are vilified as blameworthy or
undeserving, it is easier to justify discriminatory treatment."205 It went on to
say that the examples of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, relied upon by the
Court in Keegstra, were not isolated instances, pointing to the former
Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur, and Uganda as more modem instances
of ethnic cleansing and genocide preceded by rampant hate speech.206
In conducting the proportionality analysis required under the Oakes test,
however, the Court did find that one clause of the provision in the
201. Id. at para. 42-43.
202. Id. at para. 45.
203. Id. at para. 51.
204. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, para. 73; see also sources inandtext associated with supra
notes 38 and 174-181.
205. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, para. 71.
206. Id. at para. 72. For the Supreme Court's consideration of hate speech as a factor in the
Rwanda genocide, see Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2
S.C.R. 100 (Can.).
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Saskatchewan Human Rights Code was not rationally connected to the
objective, and was overbroad and vague.207 It will be recalled that Section
14(1)(b) prohibited the publication or display of any representation "that
expose or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts
the dignity of any person of class of persons on the basis of a prohibited
ground."2 08 Part of the argument in the case, and indeed much of the broader
criticism of the provision, was that the clause "ridicules, belittles or otherwise
affronts the dignity of any person. . ." was far too low and vague a threshold,
and as such constituted an unjustifiable limitation on free expression. On this
point the Court agreed, finding that this clause did "not rise to the level of
ardent and extreme feelings" that are essential to the constitutionality of the
hate speech limitations.209 It went on to explain that expression that belittles a
minority group or "attacks its dignity through jokes, ridicule or insults may be
hurtful and offensive" but that "offensive ideas are not sufficient to ground a
justification for infringing on freedom of expression. "210 Thus, the Court
found this clause not rationally connected to the legislative objective of
addressing systemic discrimination, and finding that the provision could
survive with this clause having been severed, struck it down.2 1'
The Court went on to find that the surviving narrow provision was
sufficiently carefully tailored, minimally impairing the right, and that the
benefits to be obtained by achieving the objective were proportionate to the
harm caused by the limited infringement of the right.2 12 In doing so,
however, it considered several more important points, which again reflect
significant differences when compared to the American approach. In
considering the overbreadth question, as part of the minimal impairment
element of the analysis, the Court noted that the nature of the expression is a
relevant consideration. Not in the creation of specific categories of lesser
protected speech as in the American approach, but in considering the extent
to which the expression that is limited by the legislation is closer to or further
from the core values underlying the right. These core values are, of course,
informed by the three rationales that were discussed earlier, namely,
furthering the democratic process, the search for truth, or personal
fulfillment.2 13 To the extent the expression in question is further away from
207. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, paras. 92-94.
208. SaskatchewanHumanRights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 (as amended), s. 14(1)(b) (Can.).
209. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, para. 89, 111.
210. Id. at para. 90.
211. Id. at paras. 92-94.
212. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, paras. 101-147.
213. Id. atpara. 112.
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the core values, it will "affect its value relative to other Charter rights, the
exercise or protection of which may infringe freedom of expression."2 14 As
had been found in both Keegstra and Taylor before this, the Court noted that
hate speech "strays some distance from the spirit of s. 2(b), and hence
conclude that restrictions on expression of this kind may be easier to justify
than other infringements of s. 2(b)."215 Hate speech is distant from the core
values precisely because it not only does little to promote the underlying
rationales, but can impede them. Consideration of the extent to which the
expression in question fulfills the underlying purpose of freedom of speech,
in a limited manner in the course of considering whether the limitation is
justifiable, might be an attractive alternative to employing pigeonholes for
lesser-protected categories of speech.
Another significant difference in approach was reflected in the Court's
consideration of intent. The applicant, as well as other critics of these human
rights law provisions in general, had argued that the lack of a requirement o
demonstrate an intent to foster hatred made the provision too broad. The
Court's response does not so much stand in contrast to the American
approach to hate speech legislation, as it does to the American approach to
discrimination in general. It will be recalled that the Supreme Court of the
United States has held that in order to ground a claim of discrimination based
on a suspect class such as race, in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, one must establish "invidious intent" to
discriminate. Merely establishing that a law or government action has had a
"disparate impact" on members of a racial minority (for instance) does not
trigger heightened scrutiny.2 16  The Canadian approach to discrimination
under Section 15 of the Charter is quite different, with the Supreme Court
having consistently held that laws that have either the intent or the effect of
discriminating on one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination will be in
violation of the right, subject to the justification analysis.217 That perspective
was similarly reflected in the Court's consideration of hate speech provisions
human rights legislation, as it found in both Taylor and Whatcott hat because
systemic and structural discrimination is more prevalent than intentional
forms of discrimination, it is entirely reasonable for the legislation to focus
on effect, and not to require proof of discriminatory intent. Indeed, to focus
214. Id.
215. Id. at para. 113 (internal citations and quotes not included).
216. Washingtonv. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
217. Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.); and Law v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.).
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on intent, the Court held, would be to defeat the primary goal of
antidiscrimination statutes.218
IV. Finding the Right Balance
Having conducted an overview of each of the different approaches to hate
speech laws, it now remains to explore how such a comparative analysis may
help us in thinking about the scope and substance of an optimal approach to
hate speech legislation. An optimal approach would be one that goes some
way towards protecting identifiable groups from the very real harm posed by
hate speech, while limiting government infringement of the right to freedom
of speech to the very minimum necessary to achieve that objective.
Others have observed that the approaches to he problem of hate speech
in different countries illustrates some of the more fundamental differences in
those national systems regarding the conception and priority of rights in
different systems.219 In this sense, the Canadian system reflects the emphasis
on equality as a substantive right and the privileging of multiculturalism,
while the American system reflects an emphasis on liberty and freedom from
government interference over equality and equal protection.2 20 We might
add to this that the Japanese system reflects both a tendency towards the
exercise of "authority without power," a weak approach to rights
enforcement generally, and most critically, a reluctance to protect the rights
of minorities.221 The complex historical reasons for these different national
ideas about the relationship between law and fundamental rights is obviously
beyond the scope of this short work-though some of these reasons will be
apparent o even the casual reader of history. But these different higher-order
national conceptions of rights do, of course, influence and inform the more
specific aspects of the different systems as they relate to hate speech laws.
Here, I will begin the discussion at only a slightly lower level of abstraction,
with the issue of how the different systems view the relationship between hate
speech law, the right to equal treatment, and equal protection. This, as
discussed briefly at the outset and in passing during the xamination of each
national approach, is key to the very idea that hate speech laws implicate a
tension between the right to equality and the right to freedom of expression.
218. Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 931-32 (Can.);
Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, para. 126.
219. Moran, supra note 38, at 1425-26; Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 1523-24.
220. Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 1523-24.
221. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text, and Part I-C.
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A. Recognizing the Implication of Equality Rights
It will have become obvious from our review of the different systems
that there is a considerable difference on this idea that hate speech implicates
constitutional equality rights. As we have seen, Canadian law-makers and
the Supreme Court of Canada have embraced the idea that hate speech law
has the object and purpose of fulfilling the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection and equal benefit under the law, while neither the American nor
Japanese legislatures and courts have not tended to recognize such a
relationship. Indeed, in the context of other tensions between
antidiscrimination legislation and First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech or freedom of religion, there is a tendency to dismiss as irrelevant any
invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, precisely
because the discrimination at issue is among private persons.222 In other
words, because the discrimination prohibited by the antidiscrimination law
is not within a relationship between the individual and the state, the
constitution does not apply. As such, so the argument goes, it is a mistake to
suggest that a second constitutional right is implicated at all, far less that it
could be in tension with the first right at issue. Given this quite pervasive
perspective, it is perhaps necessary to pause and consider in more detail just
how fundamental rights might in theory be implicated, and thus stand in
tension with other rights, in these sorts of circumstances.
It is perhaps best to begin with an example of obvious conflict or tension
between constitutional rights. The sharpest and most direct tensions between
two constitutional rights arise when the government takes action or enacts
law for the purpose of fulfilling or enforcing one right, but in the process, is
said to directly limit or infringe a different right. Thus, for instance, when
Colorado sought to amend its constitution so as to prohibit the enactment of
any law or ordinance extending to gays and lesbians the right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation, it did so on the
ostensible grounds that Colorado was thereby seeking to protect the rights of
other residents to freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of
association. The Supreme Court, in the case Romer v. Evans,223 struck down
the amendment as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court, in finding that the amendment was motived by
animus towards gays and lesbians, clearly questioned the validity of the
claim that its true purpose was to protect the right to freedom of religion and
222. See infra notes 227-251 and accompanying text; but see Shannon Gilreath& Arley Ward,
Same-Sex Marriage, ReligiousAccommodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 237 (2016).
223. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
[Vol. 45:3512
freedom of speech224-but if we were to accept the Colorado argument at
face value, it would reflect a kind of direct tension between constitutional
rights. The government of Colorado, however, had simply not got the
balance right. In seeking to enhance protections for the right to religious
freedom-which it was thought could be potentially infringed by the
operation of broad antidiscrimination laws-the government of Colorado
had unjustifiably violated the separate right of gays and lesbians to equal
225
protection.22 Given that constitutional rights relate primarily to the
relationship between the state and the individual, such cases as this constitute
a true and direct conflict among competing rights, in a zero-sum game in
which one right or the other is going to be more compromised directly by
state action, depending on where the line is drawn and how the tension is
resolved. And at least from some theoretical perspectives, in which
fundamental rights are seen as having similar weight and importance,
governments should be seeking to find an equilibrium point at which each
right is compromised in equal measure, with each protected to the maximum
extent possible without excessively impinging on the competing right, so as
to make the necessary impingement on both justifiable.
It is quite common, however, for tensions between or among rights to
arise in situations in which the conflict is not quite so direct. Rather than
cross-cutting government action directly affecting two separate rights of
individuals in their relationship with the state, one side of the equation
involves the relationship among persons in the private sector. Thus, the
government is seen to be directly infringing one right through the enactment
of law or policy for the purpose of protecting certain constitutional values
from being violated by private actors. By constitutional values, I mean a
value that flows from or is informed by the idea that forms the foundation of
the right. But while a right gives rise to an enforceable claim, the value does
not. The idea that individuals should be free from discrimination on the basis
of race forms the foundation of the equal protection clause. It gives rise to a
right enforceable against the state, but this constitutionally grounded idea
may be characterized as a value that informs government legislation of
224. Id. at 632.
225. Of course, as the Supreme Court suggested in this case, antidiscrimination laws that
prohibit businesses from discriminating, in the provision of services or in employment, against
people on the basis of sexual orientation, do not actually infringe the right to freedom of religion
in a meaningful way. But that issue is heading back to the Supreme Court in Craig v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), the appeal from which was heard by the Supreme
Court in December 2017.
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private relations. This is not an idea well developed in American
constitutional thought, but is part of constitutional discourse in Canada.226
This idea of limiting a right while trying to give effect to a constitutional
value, is reflected in precisely the sort of antidiscrimination laws that were
at issue in Romer v. Evans. When such laws are seen to prohibit an individual
(or a private corporation) from discriminating against persons on the basis of
their sexual orientation, for instance, the law is challenged as violating the
individual's right to free exercise of religion. 227 The antidiscrimination law
is enacted to prevent private entities from discriminating against people on
the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and the like, in the
context of employment, and access to accommodations and other services.
But, this can be viewed as the government seeking to protect a constitutional
right, or least the values and interests underlying a constitutional right, from
private encroachment. And thus, the enactment and operation of such laws,
to the extent that they legitimately impinge on a separate constitutional right,
can be said to create a tension between the right to equal protection and that
second right, even though the tension is somewhat oblique or indirect.228
It is this more indirect form of tension that characterizes the dilemma
posed by hate speech laws. This is clearly contemplated by the ICCPR and
the CERD. As mentioned earlier, the ICCPR explicitly requires countries to
prohibit by law "any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence," in furtherance
of the separate right to be treated equally and not to be discriminated against
on the basis of such characteristics as race, national origin, and religion. Yet,
it also requires states to guarantee, respect, and enforce the right to freedom
226. For Supreme Court discussion of the scope and operation of Charter values, albeit in the
context of administrative law decision-making, see Dord v. Barreau de Qudbec, [2012] 1 S.C.R.
395 (Can.); and see Lorne Sossin & Mark Friedman, Charter Values and Administrative Justice,
67 S.C. L. REV. 391 (2014).
227. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., Colorado Court of Appeals, Case No.
14CA1351, Aug. 12, 2015; cert. granted June 26, 2017, argument heard December 5, 2017.
228. To be crystal clear on the difference between these two scenarios, inRomer v. Evans the
government was trying to implement a constitutional amendment that would strip
antidiscrimination laws of any protections for gays and lesbians, which directly implicated the
Equal Protection Clause. On the other hand, the operation of such antidiscrimination laws, in their
protection of individuals in private relations from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual
orientation, and so forth, seeks to protect the values and interests that the Equal Protection Clause
is designed to protect in the public sphere. Where the operation of such law impinges on a separate
constitutional right, the tension between that right and equal protection is thus indirect; whereas in
Romer v. Evans, the government's proposed constitutional amendment, which would undermine one
right in order to enhance the protections of another, created a direct tension between the two rights.
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of expression.229  Similarly, the CERD requires state parties to ensure
equality before the law in ensuring the right to freedom of expression and
opinion, but at the same time obligates state parties to enact laws to prohibit
and punish the "dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination . . ." as well as "propaganda activities,
which promote and incite racial discrimination."2 30 The CERD Committee,
in one of its General Recommendations on treaty interpretation, quite
explicitly articulated the connection between the two rights:
The relationship between proscription of racist hate speech
and the flourishing of freedom of expression should be seen
as complimentary and not the expression of a zero sum game
where the priority given to one necessitates the diminution
of the other. The rights to equality and freedom from
discrimination, and the right to freedom of expression,
should be fully reflected in law, policy, and practice as
mutually supportive human rights.231
As we have seen, in the Canadian system hate speech laws have
similarly been accepted as having the purpose of implementing within the
private sphere the constitutional guarantee of equality and the right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of race and similar immutable personal
characteristics. Again, such laws target and seek to prevent discrimination
perpetrated by private entities, which is discrimination that would not
directly implicate constitutional rights or ground constitutional claims. But
the government nonetheless views legislative protection against such
discrimination as being a fulfillment of the constitutional right o equality.
The absence of such legislative protection is moreover seen as constituting a
failure to fully realize the equal protection and equal benefit under the law
guaranteed by the constitution. Indeed, when Alberta failed to include sexual
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the Provincial
antidiscrimination legislation, and a gay teacher challenged the law for its
failure to protect him after he was fired because of his sexual orientation, the
Supreme Court of Canada found the antidiscrimination law itself to be in
violation of the right to equality in Section 15 of the Charter.232 The effort
229. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 19, 20, and 26; CERD, supra note 5, arts. 4, 5.
230. CERD, supra note 5, arts. 4, 5. See also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 35, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (2013) [hereinafter
CERD Committee Recommendation No. 35].
231. CERD Committee Recommendation No. 35, supra note 230, atpara. 45.
232. Vriendv. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (Can.).
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to provide such legislative protection in the form of hate speech laws, however,
will necessarily constitute a direct government infringement of the right to
freedom of expression, for which the government must provide a powerful
justification. And therein lies the tension between constitutional rights,
notwithstanding that hate speech addresses the conduct of private entities.
Our review of the American approach, however, suggests that hate
speech laws are seen first and foremost as a senious threat to freedom of
speech. Moreover, and most importantly, the prevailing American view is
that even if a failure to prevent hate speech may result in increased levels of
discrimination by private entities, private discrimination itself is not a
constitutional issue and does not implicate the equal protection clause. That
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause should not be understood
to apply to private action was established by the Supreme Court in the Civil
Rights Cases, soon after the amendment was promulgated.233 The Supreme
Court has in other contexts denied that the Bill of Rights requires government
to affirmatively protect people from private action.234 And, as others have
observed, the American judiciary has generally failed to recognize the extent
to which the hate speech cases implicate equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.235 Even in Beauharnais, the high water mark of
hate speech cases, in which the most egregiously racist anti-African
American speech was at issue, the Court provided scant indication that equal
protection considerations were animating its thinking, either in terms of
justifying a limitation on freedom of speech, or informing the purpose and
rationale of the law in question.236 Thus, in contrast to the Canadian and
international human rights approach, the idea is not well established that
constitutional rights might recommend, far less require, government action
to provide protection for related values and interests within the private
sphere. Governments are of course free to pass laws to provide such
protection, but to the extent the resulting laws impinge on another
constitutional right, the argument that the law was passed to implement
233. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
234. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ("a State's
failure to protect and individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of
the Due Process Clause").
235. SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 185; Rosenfeld, supra note 91, at 90; Moran, supra note 38,
at 131-39.
236. Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Sunstein makes a similar point. SUNSTEIN,
supra note 82, at 185.
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constitutional protections within the private sphere will not find much
purchase as ajustification for the violation of the other constitutional right.23 7
Yet notwithstanding this mainstream characterization of the American
approach, there are some toeholds here and there upon which one could
begin to develop a normative argument for the recognition of a relationship
between private discrimination and the equal protection clause. For instance,
in Romer v. Evans, discussed above, the Supreme Court held that Colorado's
effort to deliberately and affirmatively deny a particular class of persons the
same protections against private discrimination that were offered to other
identifiable groups, constituted a violation of the equal protection clause-
even when that group was not defined by a suspect classification.2 38 More
explicitly, the courts have upheld Federal civil rights legislation enacted
pursuant to the "enforcement provisions" of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court has held that the enforcement
provisions permit Congress to enact laws in order to implement and fulfill
the purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments, even where such laws
tranche on state powers, and interfere with private relations. They vary
slightly in wording, but Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
simply that "[t]he Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."2 39
Thus, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., the Court held that the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866240-which provided that all
citizens of the United States shall have the same rights as are enjoyed by
white citizens to, among other things, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real property-was a valid law enacted in accordance with the enforcement
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment, and could be invoked by an African
American who had been discriminated against by private individuals
refusing to sell him a house because of his race.24 1 Or, to put it more starkly,
in order to enforce and implement the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress
could enact laws to eliminate racial barriers to acquiring property,
notwithstanding that under the Constitution of the United States, property
was properly within the jurisdiction of State governments rather than
Congress, and the purchase and sale of property was a private transaction.24 2
237. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
238. Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626-636 (1996).
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
241. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
242. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
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Similarly, in United States v. Guest,243 two defendants were prosecuted
for conspiring to deprive African Americans of the right to use state owned
and operated facilities in Georgia, pursuant to a Federal law that made it a
crime to conspire to deprive citizens of the free exercise of any right or
244privilege enjoyed under the Constitution. The accused challenged the law
in part because there was no state action involved in depriving the victims of
their rights, but the Supreme Court rejected the argument, and several of the
concurring Justices held that notwithstanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply to private action, the enforcement provision
empowers Congress to "enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or
without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment Rights."245
This must be tempered, however, by acknowledging that the Court has more
recently foreclosed most arguments that Congress can enact national
antidiscrimination law under the authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In US. v. Morrison,24 6 which involved Federal legislation
providing a civil cause of action for victims of gender-based violence, a slim
majority of the Court questioned the validity of the concurring opinions in
Guest, and denied that Congress could, under authority of the enforcement
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, enact laws directed exclusively at
the discriminatory action of private persons.247 The dissent, relying on such
cases as City of Boerne v. Flores,248 argued that the Court had in the past
upheld Federal remedial egislation, enacted under this same authority, that
applied to private actors for conduct that would not itself be
unconstitutional-and that doing so could influence states to provide
249
stronger protections.
Morrison may have made more difficult any arguments that Congress
could invoke the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact antidiscrimination law directed at private action (though on issues of
the United States, or any place subject o their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The
Court reasoned that the enforcement provision gave Congress authority to pass laws necessary to
abolish all "badges and incidents of slavery," and that the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1868
did just that. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439-440.
243. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, J., Black, J., and Fortas, J.
concurring).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
245. Guest, 383 U.S. at762.
246. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
247. Id. at 620-22.
248. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
249. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665-66 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.,
Ginsburg, J., and Stevens, J.).
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race, the enforcement provision of the Thirteenth Amendment remains more
available). And yet, there are other such Federal antidiscrimination laws,
arguably animated by the same values that form the foundation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and which, moreover,
involve subject matter limits on expression. Antidiscrimination provisions
that form part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,250 for instance,
include prohibitions on discrimination comprising of conduct, including
speech, that contributes to the creation of "intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment."2 51 In a case involving claims of sexual harassment,
the Supreme Court endorsed and upheld this understanding of discrimination
in the legislation.252 The similarity between expression that causes a hostile
work environment and hate speech is not hard to see, and indeed I am arguing
for a hate speech law that would be far more narrowly drawn. Yet, while the
Title VII provisions are surely drawing upon the constitutional values
animating the equal protection clause, they were not explicitly enacted to
fulfill the Fourteenth Amendment. No First Amendment challenge to the
workplace harassment provisions have yet been decided by the Supreme
Court.253 In sum, while there is little recognition of any relationship between
the Equal Protection Clause and legislation seeking to prevent private
discrimination caused by hate speech, there is some basis elsewhere in
American jurisprudence for developing an argument for recognizing such a
relationship-or at least the recognition that hate speech laws are animated
by the same constitutional values as the Equal Protection Clause.
Similar arguments can be made about Japan. As indicated in Part II
above, there has been no indication that the Diet recognizes that
antidiscrimination laws in general, or the recent hate speech legislation in
particular, has either the purpose or effect of fulfilling the right to equality in
Article 14 of the Constitution. But the courts have in the past interpreted
legislation in a manner that was quite explicitly informed by constitutional
rights, and indeed by the right to equality in Article 14. Thus, in the famous
Nissan Motors case, involving discrimination against women in the
workplace, the Supreme Court endorsed the manner in which the lower
courts had employed the constitutional values of the equality right in Article
14 to inform and give substance to statutory provisions governing the private
250. 42 U.S.C. §. 2000(e) etseq.
251. Meritor Bankv. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986).
252. Id. My thanks to Bill Rich for directing my attention to this line of argument.
253. For analysis of the issue, see e.g., Eugene Volokh, Thinking AheadAbout Freedom ofSpeech
and Hostile WorkEnvironment Harassment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305 (1996).
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relationship between employers and employees.254 Moreover, in the Kyoto
Korean School case discussed in Part I above, the Kyoto District Court's
holding that the defamatory speech came within the scope of the definition
of discrimination in the CERD, was only one step removed from recognizing
that limiting such speech is for the purpose of enforcing a right to equality
by preventing discrimination.25 5 Thus, even more so than for the United
States, there is a basis for suggesting that legislatures and courts can
recognize the role of constitutional rights, or constitutional values, in
informing the purpose and scope of legislation governing private relations.
There is, therefore, a starting point in both the United States and Japan
for arguing that hate speech laws could be understood as fulfilling the
purpose of a constitutional right to equality, or at a minimum as being
informed by the constitutional values underlying that right. But there is also
in both countries evidence that neither the legislatures nor the courts take
sufficiently seriously the nature and extent of the harm that can be caused by
hate speech. There is a wealth of social science literature on such harm, and
it has been decades since that evidence has been brought into the mainstream
of legal scholarship.256 As reviewed above, the Supreme Court of Canada
recognized and accepted that evidence of harm almost thirty years ago.257
What is more, the gravity of that harm informed the Court's analysis of
whether the infringement of the right to freedom of expression caused by
narrow hate speech laws could be justified.2 58 As Mayo Moran has examined
in some detail, American judges have tended to minimize and even trivialize
the nature and extent of such harm, reducing the concern to "hurt feelings"
and the like, and suggesting that the effect of "mere words" is transient.259
In contrast, the American courts have readily justified content-based, and
even viewpoint-based, limits on speech when the harm that the law is
intended to avoid is viewed as sufficiently serious or grave, notwithstanding
the august position of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech in the
pantheon of rights and liberties. The fact that the limits imposed by hate
254. Supreme Court Judgment, (Mar. 24, 1981), 35 Minshii 2 300 (Nissan Motors case)
(holding that "a lower compulsory retirement age for women than for men constitutes
discrimination against women based solely on their gender and is irrational discrimination invalid
under Article 90 of the Civil Code . . . Article 1-2). For an English translation of this case, under
the title Nissan Motors, Inc. v. Nakamoto, see BEER & ITOH, supra note 67, at 179-81.
255. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
256. For examples, see supra note 38 and 174-81.
257. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 174-181, and 186-187.
259. Moran, supra note 38; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 186; and see Rosenfeld, supra
note 91, at 1559-61.
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speech law are neverjustified suggests that the harm posed is not sufficiently
recognized; and the corollary is that if the harm was fully appreciated,
narrowly tailored hate speech law could be upheld. As Cass Sunstein sums
it up, viewpoint-based limitation will be permitted "when there is no serious
risk of illegitimate government motivation, when low-value or unprotected
speech is at issue, when the skewing effects on the system is minimal, and
government is able to make a powerful showing ofharm ."260 Laws designed
to prevent the serious harm caused by hate speech, and in particular fulfill
the constitutional guarantee against unjust discrimination, satisfy this test.
I want to suggest that it is crucially important to recognize that hate
speech laws can and should implicate equality rights-that they ought to be
crafted with a view to fulfilling the promise of constitutional equal protection
rights. And that as such, they thus trigger a tension between two fundamental
constitutional rights. This is not simply because I take the harm of hate speech
seriously and want to develop protections against the discrimination that it can
spawn-though that is certainly true too. Rather, it is because this recognition
gives rise to a compelling logic, an almost naturally developed and entirely
coherent argument in favor of the justification of narrowly tailored hate speech
laws. In contrast to laws that grope for an appropriate purpose and objective,
and for which a constitutional justification is hard to find, this argument is
naturally shaped by an understanding of hate speech laws as furthering the
values and protecting the interests that are enshrined in the constitutional
equality rights provisions of most constitutional democracies.
In the absence of any underlying constitutional imperative, for instance,
the American approach has tended to gravitate towards imminent violence
and disruption of the peace as the limiting principle for laws that might
justifiably limit expression that is in the realm of hate speech. The
underlying concern driving this approach is that to look for justification that
is less significant than the prevention of violence, is to begin down a slippery
slope upon which there will be no principle of sufficient gravity to find
purchase. But the Canadian approach suggests just such a principle-one
informed by a constitutionally grounded right to equality and not to be
discriminated against. It is the prohibition of expression that is likely to
foster hatred, contempt, and vilification of the most serious kind, which is
likely to lead to harmful discrimination and persecution, and is far from the
core of the right to free expression. The concern is not imminent violence or
disturbance of the peace, but the serious harm that hate speech can cause to
not only the targets of hatred and the victims of the resulting discrimination
and persecution, but to the democratic values and the rule of law itself. It is
260. SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 177.
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ultimately a concern for the protection of the constitutionally grounded right
to equal protection and equal benefit of the law. This provides a powerful
constitutionally based explanation for the object and purpose of hate speech
laws. What is more, it also provides the basis for ready-made and internally
coherent limitations on the scope of the laws' impact on free expression. As
such, with a compelling objective and narrowly tailored limits, it thus lends
itself to the possibility of justification under most judicial doctrines
applicable to the right to freedom of expression-even, arguably, the strict
scrutiny standard of review in the United States. In the remaining sections,
I turn to explore in more detail how the logic of this argument plays out in
the language of specific hate speech provisions, and in the judicial doctrine
employed to assess the constitutionality of such laws.
B. Natural Limits of Hate Speech Laws
As was illustrated by our review hate speech related legislation above,
there has been a considerable range of stated legislative objectives, and
underlying concerns driving such objectives, which in turn has translated
into a considerable variance in the nature and scope of expression that was
prohibited. It should be self-evident that differences in object and purpose
will lead to differences in scope and substance of the limitations of such laws.
Let us then begin by considering in more detail the object and purpose of the
laws we have reviewed. It will be recalled that in the American cases, with
laws that were formulated (or interpreted as having been formulated) to limit
fighting words, the concern was that the prohibited speech could provoke a
violent reaction on the part of the subject and target of the speech, violence
that would be directed towards the speaker, and so disturb the peace.26' In
the case of laws that sought to prohibit incitement to violent or unlawful
conduct, the concern was just that--that the prohibited speech could provoke
the target audience to commit violent or criminal acts, directed at someone
other than the speaker, typically but not always the subject of the speech.262
In the case of both fighting words and incitement, the overarching object and
purpose was to prevent imminent violence and disturbances of the peace, not
necessarily to prevent harm to the listener, or even the subjects of hatred or
contempt in the speech. It will be recalled that in Brandenburg, while the
speech vilified African Americans, the prosecution was actually based on
incitement to violence against the government.263 It is true that in the case
261. See supra Part II-B.
262. See supra Part II-B.
263. Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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of laws seeking to prevent a species of true threats, as in Virginia v. Black,
the concern is the potential harm to the persons who were the target of the
threat, in terms of fear and distress the threat would trigger. But even here,
the element of imminent violence is again lurking just below the surface.264
Turning to Japan, we saw that the recent ground-breaking litigation was
grounded in laws that prohibited criminal and civil libel, insult, and
obstruction of commerce, all of which required that there be specific victims
who were the target of the expression and conduct in question. None of these
laws have the object and purpose of preventing the fostering of hate or
preventing discrimination, but were merely available for the prosecution of
a very specific instance of hate speech.265 As for the new hate speech law,
the object and purpose is indeed to reduce unfair and discriminatory speech,
though it is without any reference to the constitutional right to equality, and
it is for the limited protection of a very narrowly defined category of persons
that constitute only a small subset of all the identifiable groups that are
protected by Article 14 of the Constitution.26 6
In contrast to the U.S. and Japan, however, Canadian hate speech
legislation, in terms of both the criminal law and the civil human rights law
provisions, the overarching object and purpose was to prevent the fostering
of hatred that could contribute to increased discrimination and persecution,
as explicitly informed by the constitutional equality right. The overriding
concern was the serious harm to the identifiable group targeted by the hate
speech, both directly in terms of creating in members of the group a sense of
alienation and loss of status within the community, and through the increased
discrimination against members of the group by the majority, who are often
the true target audience of the hate speech. Imminent violence or lawlessness
is not the concern--though, it will be recalled, other Canadian laws are
designed to address that separate threat. 267
These differences in object and purpose, and the overarching concerns
that inform those objectives, in turn affect the scope and subject matter of
the laws. Because the Canadian legislation is explicitly informed by the
constitutional equality right, with the purpose of preventing discrimination,
it is only natural that the parameters of the legislation be defined by the
prohibited grounds of discrimination in the constitutional equality right.
Thus, the Criminal Code provision prohibits the promotion of hatred against
264. See supra Part II-C.
265. See supra Part I-A.
266. See supra Part I-B.
267. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, (as amended), s. 319(1).
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any "identifiable group," a concept that is defined in a manner that exactly
tracks the prohibited grounds of discrimination in Section 15 of the Charter,
namely color, race, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability.26 8 The Saskatchewan Human
Rights Code provision considered above similarly prohibited any
representation that would expose to hatred any person or class of persons on
the basis of the prohibited grounds in the Act, which again track the
prohibited grounds of discrimination in Section 15 of the Charter.26 9 The
constitutional right hus provides the natural limits-the prohibited grounds
of discrimination-with which to define the narrow scope of the law crafted
to prevent discrimination. These limits are further narrowed by relying on
the concept of hatred, which as was examined above, is intended to represent
the most extreme and intense feelings of detestation and vilification. And so
the law seeks to prohibit expression that takes an extreme form designed to
foster and incite such intense emotions, through denigration, de-
legitimization, and dehumanization of the members of the identifiable group,
which it is understood will in turn lead to increased discrimination and
persecution, on the basis of shared personal characteristics that form the
prohibited grounds of discrimination in Section 15 of the Charter.270
Limited in this manner, the Criminal Code of Canada hate speech
provision is actually much narrower than most of the American laws that
were the subject of constitutional challenges discussed above. Consider the
ordinance in R.A. V v. St. Paul, which prohibited the employment of symbols
or objects such as swastikas or burning crosses, "which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender."27 1 Here the law does in
fact reflect several of the grounds of discrimination that are proscribed by
the Constitution, but the other limiting element, the emotional response of
listeners, including mere "resentment," is far broader than the concept of
"hatred" employed in the Canadian law. The Supreme Court of Canada
made quite clear that the prevention of such emotions as anger, resentment,
or other forms of offense, is not remotely sufficient to justify an infringement
on freedom of expression. The language of the law at issue in R.A. V v. St.
Paul would likely be struck down in Canada for this reason, just as the clause
268. Id. at s. 319-318. It will be noted that there are characteristics, such as sexual orientation,
included in s. 319 that are not explicitly provided for in s. 15 of the Charter, but these have been held
to be "analogous grounds" by the Supreme Court, and are understood to be within the scope of s. 15.
269. The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c S-24.1, at s. 14(1)(b) (Can.).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 200-205.
271. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, that purported to prohibit speech
that "ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person" was
struck down.272
It will be recalled, however, that there was considerable difference
between the Criminal Code of Canada provision, and the Saskatchewan
Human Rights Code provision, in that the latter did not require any element
of intent, and did not afford any explicit defenses. The Criminal Code
provision prohibits the willful promotion of hatred, which establishes a
significant specific-intent requirement. From an American perspective, this
might seem to be a necessary limitation, and any law that simply prohibits
speech that may be likely to have the effect of fostering hatred and
contributing to discrimination, whether intended or not, may go too far. This
is particularly so in light of the fact that government action that cannot be
shown to have had an invidious discriminatory intent to discriminate, is not
subject to heightened scrutiny in equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment.273 Thus, for purposes of drawing potentially viable
examples of model legislation from our comparative review, the
significantly narrower Criminal Code provision is likely to be the more
acceptable as a basis for developing a new American approach to hate speech
laws. It should also be noted that the prohibited grounds of discrimination
in both Canada and Japan are far more extensive than in the United States.
The list of "suspect" and "quasi-suspect" classes that attract heightened
scrutiny in the United States is relatively short, comprising of race, national
origin, sex, and legitimacy (birth status); while discrimination on the basis
of religion is prohibited under the First Amendment. Candidate suspect
classes, such as sexual orientation, remain to be conclusively decided-
while they have clearly attracted something higher than the typical rational-
basis review, they are not yet recognized as suspect classes.274  So the
"natural limits" of hate speech as informed and defined by the constitutional
right to equal protection in the American context might also be necessarily
narrower than elsewhere.
C. Implications for Doctrine and Justification
Hate speech law that is limited in accordance with this logic, also tends
to more naturally comply with the doctrine for justifying limitations on
freedom of expression. As our review of the Canadian cases reflects, the
272. Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467, paras. 89, 111
(Can.).
273. Washingtonv. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-248 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 216.
274. See, e.g. Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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recognition that the object and purpose of the hate speech law is for the
fulfillment of the constitutional protections enshrined in the equality right
provision of the Charter, together with a fuller appreciation of the serious
harm that hate speech can cause, provides the most powerful "compelling
state interest" for limiting the right to freedom of expression. Indeed, for
those who think that an infringement of a fundamental constitutional right
can only be legitimately justified by reference to the protection or
enforcement of some other fundamental constitutional right,27 5 this objective
is the very best available. Similarly, once the law is narrowly drawn in
accordance with the natural limits provided by the prohibited grounds of
discrimination, together with the concept of hatred as described above, it is not
difficult to characterize the law as being carefully tailored and minimally
impairing the right to freedom of expression. This carefully tailored law will
only proscribe the most extreme forms of expression that are intended to foster
hatred and are likely to lead to increased discrimination and persecution.
One likely objection is this rosy characterization is that no matter how
you slice it, hate speech law along these lines is necessarily viewpoint-based,
and therefore is going to run afoul of the American doctrine as reflected in
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul. There are several different possible responses to
this objection. First, I would argue that even if we concede that the law is
viewpoint-based, it can survive strict scrutiny. Second, it can be argued that
the prohibitions along the lines of the Criminal Code of Canada provision
do not actually constitute a viewpoint-based limitation. Third, I would argue
that another way to get around the specific problem posed by viewpoint-
based limits within a proscribed category of speech, is to establish a new
category of lesser-protected speech encompassing just this kind of hate
speech, such that there is then no viewpoint discrimination within or among
the proscribed or lesser protected category of speech, as was the case in
R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul. Let me examine these three points in more detail.
To begin with the concession that the proposed form of hate speech law
is necessarily a viewpoint-based limitation on speech, I would argue that if
the justification analysis is conducted in a rigorous and meaningful way, such
a law can nonetheless survive strict scrutiny. R.A. V v. City of St. Paul
confirmed that within American constitutional law, the presumption is that
viewpoint-based limits are impermissible, but it is only a presumption, and
such laws are still subject to justification under a strict scrutiny review. 27 6
Part of the criticism of the American cases in this area is that the Court does
275. See, e.g., STUN SMITS, RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS: THE JUDGE'S
DILEMMA, Chap. 4 (2017); Stephen Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988).
276. For discussion of this rebuttable presumption, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 184-192.
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not tend to engage seriously in the application of strict scrutiny. In R.A. V v.
City of St. Paul, for instance, Justice Scalia accepted with little discussion
that the law sought to advance a compelling state interest, but then he
summarily concluded that the law was not the least restrictive alternative,
without any analysis of what the other alternatives might have been, far less
how effective they would be.277 But in the judicial review of the proposed form
of hate speech law, where the compelling state interest is to fulfill the protections
guaranteed by another constitutional right, and where the law's viewpoint-based
limits are in fact informed by and reflect the "viewpoint" of that other
constitutional right, there is reason to believe that it could survive strict scrutiny.
The primary reason for the concern around viewpoint-based limits, is
that we should be very suspicious of government motives in seeking to stifle
or suppress any particular viewpoint. But this suspicion should surely be
allayed if the viewpoint is directly informed by the Constitution itself, or to
put it another way, the viewpoint represents a constitutional value. Survival
of strict scrutiny is all the more plausible where the Court, in contemplating
the nature of the compelling state interest, also takes seriously the evidence
of significant harm that the law is designed to prevent, and considers that
harm in contrast to the very limited manner in which the law impinges on
the right to freedom of speech. Justice Stevens in particular has on a number
of occasions encouraged the Court to incorporate such a proportionality test
into the strict scrutiny analysis. 278 And even though the Court has never
formally adopted such a proportionality test, and tends not to rigorously
apply strict scrutiny in viewpoint-based cases, as discussed earlier, there are
certainly other viewpoint-based limits on freedom of speech that have
survived judicial review. 2 79 Examples include the ban on advertising in favor
of gambling at casinos,280 limitations on speaking against the effects of
unionization prior to a union election.281 As mentioned previously, such
viewpoint-based discrimination tends to be permissible when there is
minimal risk that the government's motive in imposing the limitation is
illegitimate or suspect, the skewing effects are minimal, and the limit is for
the purpose of preventing a significant demonstrable harm.282
The second argument would be that the proposed hate speech law does
not actually constitute a viewpoint-based limitation at all. This argument
277. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
278. See, e.g., Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 451-53 (1985).
279. SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 174-78.
280. Posadasv. Louis Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
281. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969).
282. SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 176.
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could actually take a few different paths. One tempting avenue is to suggest
that the form of hate speech law in question is really a harm-based limitation
rather than a viewpoint-based limitation. That is, the limit is aimed at
preventing a particular form of harm, rather than preventing a particular
viewpoint or suppressing a particular side of any argument. This may seem
apt here, given the extent to which the proposed form of hate speech law is
very much focused on the nature of the harm that the fostering of hatred and
discrimination can cause. But Justice Elena Kagan, in an article written
when she was still a professor at the University of Chicago, explained that
even if one characterizes hate speech laws as harm-based rather than
viewpoint-based, they still raise difficult questions.283 Indeed, in one sense,
the characterization as harm-based simply disguises the extent to which the
regulation is viewpoint-based. Even if the purpose of limiting speech is to
prevent the perceived harm that it causes, rather than the ideas as such, the
law is nonetheless likely to be based on a particular view of the speech, and
thus the law is likely to constitute a viewpoint-based (or at a minimum,
content-based) limitation.284 The distinction thus tends to collapse in on
itself, and at some point, becomes meaningless-all imitations can be said
to be intended, at some level of abstraction, to prevent some harm. Cass
Sunstein and others have made similar observations.285
Sunstein, however, also points to a second possible line of argument.
He has argued that the Court's formulation of presumptions against
viewpoint-based limits in R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul was appropriate, but that
it misidentified the limits in question as being viewpoint-based. Because the
law in question prohibited speech that would arouse anger or resentment on
the basis of race, for instance, it covered both anti-white and anti-black
sentiment (among other possible racist positions), and did not take a position
as between these two "viewpoints." It was true that the law singled out a
subset of the category of fighting words, and thus was a content-based
limitation, but it did not "single out a particular message for prohibition ...
[i]t has regulated on the basis of subjects for discussion, not on the basis of
viewpoint."28 6 To be sure, under the American approach content-based
limits are still subject to strict scrutiny, but are viewed with less suspicion,
as less presumptively unconstitutional, than are viewpoint-based limitations.
And thus, if the law is characterized as a content-based limitation, where the
283. Kagan, supra note 148, at 878-79.
284. Id. at 880-81.
285. SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 174-76.
286. SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 188.
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content is defined as representing the values forming foundation of another
constitutional right, it should be that much more amenable to justification
along the lines laid out above. 287
The third and final argument in response to the objection on viewpoint-
based limitation grounds, is that if the U.S. courts were to recognize and
establish a new category of lesser-protected speech to encompass hate speech
laws, then such laws would not constitute discriminatory viewpoint-based
limits within the lesser protected category of speech. It will be recalled that
in R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul Justice Scalia stated that it had been open to the
City of St. Paul to proscribe all fighting words-that is, all forms of speech
within the proscribable category-it just could not carve out and
discriminate against particular viewpoints within the category. If a new
category of lesser-protected speech was defined as covering speech intended
to foster hatred against identifiable groups on the basis of shared personal
characteristics that constitute suspect or quasi-suspect classes under the
equal protection clause, then hate speech laws similarly defined would not
be making any distinctions among categories within the proscribed speech.
This argument for creating a new category of lesser-protected speech
within the American constitutional system is bolstered again by the
recognition of the relationship between hate speech law and the
constitutional right to equal protection, and thus the tension between the right
to freedom of speech and the right to equal protection. In the same manner
that the content, scope, and limits of hate speech law tend to be naturally
defined by the logic that flows from recognizing this relationship, so too the
relevant doctrine for purposes of judicial review of hate speech law should
be naturally informed and shaped by the implication of two constitutional
rights in tension. As our review of the cases has illustrated, hate speech does
not "fit" or conform to any of the categories of "proscribable" or lesser-
protected speech that have been invoked in cases relating to hate speech. The
concerns that underlie the rationale for those categories are quite different.
And yet, as we have seen, the narrowly defined speech that would be subject
to the proposed hate speech laws are far from the core rationales for freedom
of speech. For while "political" in one sense, both the form and purpose of
such speech--to foster hatred against an identifiable group and to isolate and
alienate them within society, and indeed to drive them out of the marketplace
of ideas-is not consistent with underlying rationale for protecting political
expression in a democracy. So long as the American approach continues to
embrace the use of discrete categories of lesser-protected speech as part of
287. This argument is made in more detail in Little, Hating Hate Speech, supra note 133.
288. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-91 (1992).
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the doctrine for justifying limits on expression, the foregoing analysis
provides a powerful rationale for establishing a new narrowly defined
category of hate speech as one those categories of lesser-protected speech.
Conclusion: Striking the Right Balance
What does the foregoing examination of different approaches tell us
about the "right balance" and how to strike it? I do not think that any system
has found the perfect equilibrium, in terms of where to draw the line between
what level of hate speech is permissible and that which is not. In that sense,
no one has got the balance "right." But in terms of at least identifying exactly
what should be balanced, I would suggest hat the Canadian approach gets
closer to getting the issue right, and points us in the right direction. In
particular, it is the only one of the three systems that actually corresponds to
the international human rights law view, that the balance to be struck is one
between two separate fundamental rights, as opposed to being a balance
between freedom of speech and a mere piece of social-policy based
legislation. In the detail of its approach the Canadian system ay not have
found the perfect equilibrium in resolving this tension between the two
competing rights, but it is at least trying to balance the right things. In this
sense, it is striking the right balance.
This is because, as I have argued, there is a powerful logic and internal
coherence that flows from an understanding that hate speech law should be
intended to fulfill the promise of constitutional equality rights, thereby
creating a tension between two constitutional rights. Hate speech laws
enacted with this purpose get at the true harm that we should be concerned
about, which is the fostering of hatred against identifiable groups, which
causes direct psychological harm to the members of such groups, results in
an increase in discrimination and even persecution against the members of
such groups, and leads to the more amorphous injury to democratic
principles, and even to the right to freedom of expression itself. The purpose
of such laws, which are intended to fulfill a constitutional right o equality
and protection from discrimination, and to prevent the serious harms that this
form of hate speech poses, constitutes a compelling state interest. That
compelling state interest should be able to satisfy the first element of any
justification analysis in the judicial review of the consequent infringement
on freedom of expression. In the context of constitutional judicial review of
such a law, the law's explicit objective of furthering the fulfillment of a
constitutional guarantee cannot help but be a compelling state interest. But
in addition to this, laws so enacted will also naturally constitute narrow but
reasonable limits on freedom of expression when subjected to judicial
review. I say naturally, because of the manner in which the purpose and
[Vol. 45:3530
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function of the law is informed by constitutional values underlying the right
to equality-and thus the limits of the law will be shaped by the prohibited
grounds of discrimination. While other hate speech laws flounder in search
of sufficiently important purposes and limiting principles, such as imminent
violence or other disturbances of the peace, hate speech laws with this
explicit constitutional objective have tailor-made limitations that are
virtually logically required-that the law prohibit speech that is intended to
and will likely increase the very kind of discrimination that is prohibited by
the constitution itself
Now, it is true that the constitution does not provide the standard for
where to draw the line on such likelihood of certain speech causing
discrimination. That is to say, for instance, where to draw the line on the
spectrum between the articulation of policy rationales for restricting
immigration from certain countries at one end, to vitriolic calls for the
"elimination" of certain ethnic groups, employing the most vile and
dehumanizing terminology at the other end. But there is much to commend
the Canadian approach of using the concept of hatred and restricting the law
to the prohibition of such forms of expression that are likely to foster the
most extreme forms of hatred, vilification, and contempt. This concept,
while not contained in the constitution of any of the systems under study, is
suggested by the evidence of the serious harm caused by precisely such
extreme forms of hate speech, and by its relationship to the kind of
discrimination the constitution does prohibit. A law prohibiting such hate
speech cannot help but impinge upon the right to freedom of expression. It
is necessarily both a content-based and subject-matter limitation, and from
some perspectives may be characterized as a viewpoint-based limitation on
speech. But once the hate speech law has the object and purpose of fulfilling
the constitutional right to equality, its form is necessarily tailored by
principles of non-discrimination in that right, and the harm that it addresses
is fully recognized and internalized into the analysis, then the hate speech
law's very limited infringement of the right to freedom of expression triggers
a tension between two fundamental constitutional rights-or, at a minimum,
between the constitutional values that are the foundation of such rights. This
understanding must inform and shape how courts will approach the judicial
review of such hate speech laws, and assess the extent to which their
infringement of freedom of expression can be reasonably justified. Finding
the appropriate balance between them will remain difficult, but at least then
we will be considering the right balance. This is certainly possible in the
context of Japan, but for reasons I have explained above, there is even room
to suggest hat it is feasible in the United States.
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